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Ending Jim Crow Life Insurance Rates 
Mary L. Heen* 
How people count and measure embodies certain assumptions about the 
thing they are counting; this was true in the nineteenth century, and it is 
equally true today.1 
[E]ver since the 1880’s, Negroes have been subject to differential 
treatment by white insurance companies in that some of them, at that time, 
started to apply higher premium schedules for Negro than for white 
customers, whereas others decided not to take on any Negro business at 
all.  The underlying reason, of course, is the fact that mortality rates are 
much higher for Negroes than for whites.2 
[I]f the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our 
institutions, great is our sin.3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Earlier this decade some of America’s best-known life insurance companies 
quietly settled multi-million dollar civil rights lawsuits involving race-based life 
insurance rates and benefits.4  As a result, those companies closed a chapter of American 
                                                 
*Visiting Professor, Spring 2009, Washington and Lee University School of Law, and Professor of Law at 
the University of Richmond.  I am grateful for financial support for this project from the University of 
Richmond’s Hunton & Williams Summer Research Endowment Fund.  My thanks to reference librarians at 
the Library of Congress for guiding me through their insurance collection, and special thanks to law 
librarians John Barden, Suzanne Corriell, and Gail Zwirner at the University of Richmond and Caroline 
Osborne at Washington and Lee University for their assistance in locating additional research materials.  I 
am also grateful for the excellent research assistance provided by current and former Richmond law 
students on various portions of this project, including Alex Brackett, Katie Faulkenham, Matt Howells, 
Laura Lesikar, Valerie L’Herrou, Mohsin Reza, Sara Dehne, Jenny Grondahl, Brian Boys, and Eric Foust.  
Thanks to colleagues Corinna Barrett Lain and Shari Motro for their very helpful comments on earlier 
stages of this project. 
1 PATRICIA CLINE COHEN, A CALCULATING PEOPLE:  THE SPREAD OF NUMERACY IN EARLY AMERICA 211 
(1982) (emphasis omitted). 
2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 316 
(1944). 
3 CHARLES DARWIN, THE VOYAGE OF THE BEAGLE 526 (2d ed., P F Collier & Son 1909) (1839). 
4 E.g., Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment); MetLife Is Settling Bias Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at C12 (describing 
settlement of a lawsuit under state and federal civil rights law challenging race-based underwriting 
practices of the company from 1901 to 1972 and reporting that $250 million for associated litigation and 
regulatory costs had been set aside previously as a charge against earnings); see $1 Million Donated to 
Settle Bias Lawsuit, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 21, 2002, at E2 (reporting that Prudential had donated 
$500,000 apiece to the United Negro College Fund and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in addition to 
payments to individual policyholders as part of a settlement of a lawsuit accusing it of using race-based 
insurance rates); Joseph B. Treaster, Insurer Agrees It Overcharged Black Clients, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
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economic history that began after the Civil War with door-to-door marketing of small 
individual life insurance policies to protect poor workers and their families from the 
indignity of a pauper’s burial.5  The closing of this chapter in history also marked the end 
of a form of Jim Crow race discrimination largely invisible to the American public.  
¶2 Although the settlements provided partial recompense to black Americans harmed 
by the continuing effects of policies sold during the Jim Crow era, the litigation itself did 
not accomplish a broader shift in commercial practice.  Litigation brought under Civil 
War-era civil rights statutes6 primarily served as a “mop-up” operation following the 
industry’s elimination of race-based practices for most new policies issued after the 
beginning of the modern civil rights era.  Under pressure from civil rights advocates, for 
example, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company eliminated explicit race-based rates 
for some new policies as early as 1948.7  By the early 1960s, industry professional 
organizations had developed and approved race-integrated mortality tables as an industry-
wide standard.8  Thus, by the time the Civil Rights Movement had accomplished 
landmark legal and legislative changes in education, public accommodations, 
employment, housing, and voting rights, the biggest players in the life insurance industry 
had “voluntarily” discontinued their most visible race-based practices for newly issued 
policies.9  
¶3 This Article traces the evolution of explicit race-based insurance practices over a 
century as the American life insurance industry responded to changes in the social, 
economic, and legal status of former slaves.  It illustrates and illuminates the complex 
interaction between civil rights reform and private commercial practice.  The story told 
here, drawn from insurance company and economic histories, NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund archives, and recently revealed details from state insurance department 
                                                                                                                                                 
2000, at A1 (reporting that American General had agreed to make restitution of $206 million, mainly to 
black policyholders in five Southern states and their heirs, who as recently as earlier that year had paid up 
to a third more than white customers for small life insurance policies).  Earlier this year, the John Hancock 
Life Insurance Company agreed to a $24.4 million settlement in a class-action lawsuit which alleged that 
John Hancock racially discriminated in the sale of life insurance policies before 1959 by offering lower-
grade policies to African Americans.  Donna Goodison, Hancock Settles Bias Suit, BOSTON HERALD, April 
8, 2009, at 27 (reporting on the settlement of Norflet v. John Hancock Fin. Services, Inc. and John Hancock 
Life Ins. Co., No. 04-1099 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2007)). 
5 That market declined in importance for many major life insurance companies as living standards 
improved and the employer-based group insurance market expanded throughout the twentieth century.  
E.g., JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS:  BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 16–52 (2003). 
6 Lawsuits challenging race discrimination in life insurance rates and benefits have included claims under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibits race discrimination in the making or enforcement of 
contracts.  Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 
(2006)).  The Act’s purpose was to “giv[e] real content to the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth 
Amendment.”  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 433 (1968) (recounting the legislative history 
leading to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 42 U.S.C. § 1982); see also Runyan v. McCrary, 
427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976) (relying on same history with regard to purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
7 See discussion infra Part III.B.4, III.D. 
8 See discussion infra Part III.B.4. 
9 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SURVEY OF LIFE INSURERS RESULTS (Sept. 16, 1988) (reporting 
results of survey, in which 52 of the responding 2753 life insurance companies reported having ever used 
race-based premiums, with a majority of those companies reporting that they had discontinued issuing 
policies with race-based premiums prior to 1964 or 1965, and all but one of the rest reporting 
discontinuance by 1987; 22 reported that they were currently collecting race-based premiums for 
previously issued policies). 
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investigations and civil rights litigation, both affirms and challenges patterns of reform 
observed by legal historians outside of the private commercial context.   
¶4 Studies of the development and interpretation of constitutional law have shown 
that civil rights reforms can provoke backlash that transforms former status hierarchies 
into more modern or private forms of discrimination.10  Recognition of the basic civil 
rights of free blacks at the end of the Civil War and during the short-lived Reconstruction 
era was soon followed, for example, by a reformulation of the legal status of former 
slaves.11  After ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court distinguished between political rights 
of citizenship and private associational affinities, ushering in the Jim Crow era of state-
sanctioned social and economic segregation that persisted until the mid-twentieth 
century.12  As observed by legal historian Reva Siegel in another context, “civil rights 
reform does not simply abolish a status regime” but “in important respects, it modernizes 
the rules and rhetoric” used to justify and enforce the former status hierarchy.13   
¶5 When careful attention is paid to how race-based insurance pricing practices 
developed, an analogous privately imposed transformation can be discerned here: Private 
life insurance companies translated former race hierarchies into race-based mortality risk 
classifications.  During a period of racial retrenchment, after free blacks had challenged 
formerly settled political, social, and legal understandings, private companies 
reformulated contested status regimes into actuarial risk categories that quantified 
differences between blacks and whites.14  Mortality rate differentials led to coverage 
restrictions and to a dual race-based pricing structure in low-income markets for life 
insurance.15 
¶6 The century-long effort to outlaw race-based pricing practices in the insurance 
industry illuminates the challenges faced by those who sought reform of this 
“modernized” private commercial practice.  During the Jim Crow era, life insurance 
companies doing business in newly emerging markets began categorizing blacks as 
“substandard” mortality risks.16  Adopted after the rise of scientific racism17 and 
                                                 
10 E.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344–442 (2004); Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About 
Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1559–60 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: 
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1470 (2004). 
11 See discussion infra Part III.A and notes 91–92. 
12 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544, 551 (1896); see also discussion infra Part III.A. 
13 Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L. J. 2117, 
2179 (1996) (providing a case study of domestic assault law as it evolved from a law of marital prerogative 
to a law of marital privacy).  
14 See discussion infra Parts III.B.1, III.B.3 (discussing race-based policies adopted beginning in the 1880s 
by Prudential and by Metropolitan Life, and the rationalization of these policies in an influential study of 
“race traits” published by Prudential’s actuary at the end of the nineteenth century). 
15 See discussion of race-based practices in industrial insurance markets infra in Part III.B. 
16 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
17 See, e.g., STEVEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30–72 (1981) (discussing pre-evolutionary 
styles of scientific racism and the influence of Samuel’s Morton’s measurement by race of cranial capacity 
of skulls in the antebellum period and reporting contrary results when repeating Morton’s measuring 
experiments); see also BRUCE DAIN, A HIDEOUS MONSTER OF THE MIND: AMERICAN RACE THEORY IN THE 
EARLY REPUBLIC 227–63 (2002) (discussing the development of race theory from the American Revolution 
to the Civil War); AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN NORTH AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A 
WORLDVIEW 231–54 (1993) (discussing nineteenth century scientific contributions to ideologies about race 
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rationalized during the ascendancy of the eugenics movement,18 these race-based 
practices became firmly entrenched in the life insurance industry.   
¶7 Legal responses to race-based life insurance practices first appeared in the 1880s, 
when states began enacting civil rights laws to prohibit race discrimination in insurance.  
In 1884, for example, Massachusetts explicitly prohibited race-based rates or premiums 
for life insurance policies; several other northern states had adopted similar laws by the 
end of the nineteenth century.19  Major life insurance companies generally resisted 
legislative efforts to ban discrimination by withdrawing business from those states, by 
instructing their agents not to solicit black business, or by adopting other less visible 
race-based practices.20  The resulting segregation and segmentation of life insurance 
markets lasted well into the modern civil rights era.21   
¶8 Race-based pricing classifications and coverage restrictions proved difficult to 
dislodge not only because of the structure and legal regulation of private commercial 
insurance markets,22 but also because of the strength of the underlying ideologies of 
racial difference, race separation, and the rhetorical power of actuarial language.  
Legislation and litigation, despite some progress, proved ineffective in changing industry 
practice.23 
¶9 By the mid-twentieth century, the assumptions of scientific racism and the 
eugenics movement, which had been under attack by public intellectuals in America and 
Great Britain since the 1930s and 1940s,24 were finally disavowed.25  The shift in 
                                                                                                                                                 
differences as natural and inborn, and noting the influence of the Types of Mankind, a popular book on 
racial inequality published in 1854 that had ten editions before the end of the century); see generally 
THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1963); WILLIAM STANTON, THE 
LEOPARD’S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA, 1815–1859 (1960).   
18 E.g., ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF SCIENTIFIC RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE IN BRITAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 4 (1992).  The Supreme Court upheld the Virginia 
legislature’s eugenics-inspired 1924 compulsory sterilization act in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), 
which permitted the involuntary sexual sterilization of Carrie Buck and her family, inmates of the Virginia 
Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded.  See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating 
Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924, an anti-miscegenation law, which required registration of race at 
birth and criminalized marriage between white and non-white persons); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184 (1964) (overturning Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), which upheld Alabama’s anti-
miscegenation law and criminal prosecution of a cohabiting unmarried black man and white woman). 
19 See discussion of state anti-discrimination laws infra Part III.B.2. 
20 See discussion infra Parts III.B.2, III.D. 
21 See discussion infra Parts II, III (including the development of black-owned and operated fraternal 
benefit societies and insurance companies). 
22 The life insurance industry has long been regulated by the states and has historically objected to proposed 
federal intrusions into regulation of the business of insurance.  HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. 
SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 442 (1999).  For a brief period in the mid-
nineteenth century, leading figures in the insurance industry favored federal regulation when compliance 
with state regulations became more burdensome.  According to a leading historian of the insurance 
business, the movement for federal regulation of insurance failed, however, for three main reasons: 1) it 
was opposed by an influential state regulator, New York’s Commissioner of Insurance; 2) in the late 1860s, 
the Supreme Court ruled in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868), that an insurance policy was not a 
transaction in commerce; and 3) the organization of state insurance commissioners into the National 
Convention of Insurance Commissioners in 1871 provided a mechanism for more uniform state regulation.  
See 1 R. CARLYLE BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 1906–1952, at 83–84 (1953). 
23 See discussion infra Parts III.B.2, III.D. 
24 See discussion infra Part III.E (discussing the events leading to the rejection of scientific racism). 
25 BARKAN, supra note 18, at 279–340; see also, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 113 (noting that among 
the intellectual elite, “the ideology of white supremacy had been thoroughly undermined by 1940,” and that 
“the groundwork had been laid for a fundamental rethinking of racial differences”). 
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commercial life insurance race-based practices began soon after the military defeat of the 
Nazi regime in World War II and the post-war exposure of the horrors of the regime’s 
“Final Solution.”26 
¶10 After World War II, the struggle for civil rights gained momentum.  Unlike civil 
rights reform in education, employment, housing, and public accommodations, however, 
the adoption of racially-integrated mortality tables by the insurance industry and the 
prospective elimination of explicit race-based pricing by the major companies did not, for 
the most part, require court orders or the enactment of new federal civil rights 
legislation.27   
¶11 Instead, civil rights advocates and black customers pressured white insurance 
companies to change their race-based practices.28  Commercial practice gradually 
changed after World War II, as noted above, beginning with the equalization of race-
based rates and benefits by a leading company in 1948.  Just over a decade later, the 
industry and its regulators developed and adopted race-merged mortality tables.29  
Although significant mortality differentials remained between racially classified groups 
in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, improvements in mortality for both black and 
white Americans gave companies the maneuvering room to equalize rates and benefits as 
part of overall rate reductions for all policyholders.30   
¶12 The thesis of this Article is that the industry professionals who reformed industry 
practice during the modern civil rights era acted in light of a fundamental shift in social 
and scientific understandings of race.  With the repudiation of biological views of race 
following World War II, and with the growing political momentum of civil rights, the 
industry could no longer ignore the role played by racism in creating the social and 
environmental conditions that disadvantaged blacks.  Evidence suggests that the 
discontinuation of explicit race-based pricing classifications by the major players in the 
private insurance industry resulted in large part from a combination of the transformative 
event of World War II, the growing influence of the Civil Rights Movement, and post-
war marketplace changes.  Civil rights legislation adopted during the second 
Reconstruction of the mid-twentieth century and the broadening social and political 
movement for civil rights undoubtedly reinforced the need to modify practices for 
existing and newly issued insurance policies.  However, industry norms were already 
largely reformed by the time litigators sought relief for those still covered by the 
discriminatory policies of the Jim Crow era.   
¶13 My inquiry in this Article centers on the development and evolution of race-based 
insurance classifications and not on whether these actuarial classifications represented an 
accurate generalization of statistical groupings.31  For purposes of this discussion, I’ll 
assume that mortality differences exist to a greater or lesser extent among groups 
                                                 
26 See discussion infra in Part III.E. 
27 See discussion infra Part III. 
28 See discussion infra Part III.B.4, III.D. 
29 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
30 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
31 Although this Article does not focus on the development of actuarial statistics or the use of race 
distinctions in mortality studies more generally, mortality studies or standard tables utilized by the life 
insurance industry are referenced throughout the article in relationship to the history of the industry’s 
pricing practices. 
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classified by race, sex, national origin, or even religion.32  These differences depend upon 
whether one looks at mortality statistics for the population as a whole or for those who 
apply for insurance coverage or some other category, such as urban or rural location, state 
of residence,33 occupational group, or time in history.   
¶14 Researchers have long debated the reasons for classification-based mortality 
differences, but by the second half of the twentieth century, most tended to agree that the 
magnitude of each factor changes over time and that these group-defined differences are 
largely explained by environmental, social, and behavioral factors.34  Whether disparate 
rates or benefits for individuals based on actuarial differences between groups classified 
by race, sex, religion, or national origin ought to be permitted requires resolution of 
conflicting efficiency and fairness concerns.35   
¶15 Over a period of nearly a century, national civil rights policy eventually 
discredited explicit race-based pricing of life insurance despite continuing mortality 
differences when policyholders were grouped by race.36  Gender-based pricing of 
insurance products, by contrast, is currently a common commercial practice outside of the 
employment setting.37  The story of the rise and fall of race-based pricing thus also 
provides important insights and context for those interested in understanding the 
development of gender-based life insurance pricing practices. 
¶16 This discussion proceeds as follows.  The Article begins in Part II with a brief 
overview of the historical development of race-based pricing practices and an 
introduction to the working class life insurance markets in which they developed.  Part 
III, the core of the Article, provides a more detailed examination of the post-
emancipation use of explicit race classifications by life insurance companies, the 
development of segregated life insurance markets, and the discontinuance of race-based 
                                                 
32 For the argument that the anti-discrimination principle itself operates as a generalization not only to 
prohibit irrelevant discrimination but also, and more importantly, to prohibit generalizations that appear to 
rest on a sound statistical foundation, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND 
STEREOTYPES 151 (2003).  
33 Many types of classifications, including state of residence, for example, have historically correlated with 
mortality differences.  E.g., Louis I. Dublin, Foreword to FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, STATE AND 
REGIONAL LIFE TABLES, 1939–41, at 6 (life tables for the white population of the United States, and certain 
groups of States, by sex, showing wide variation in longevity and mortality within the United States).  
34 See Lea Brilmayer, et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and 
Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505, 538–58 (1980) (describing research with regard to both 
race and sex and concluding that “all major investigators now believe that social, cultural, environmental, 
and behavioral factors are more important than genetic or biological factors” in explaining such mortality 
differences).  Controversies over biological views of race revived toward the end of the twentieth century.  
See, e.g., Evelyn Hammonds, Straw Men and Their Followers: The Return of Biological Race, IS RACE 
“REAL”?, June 7, 2006, http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Hammonds/ (citing as examples the public debate 
provoked by RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:  INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS 
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1996), and a 2005 New York Times op-ed by the evolutionary 
developmental biologist Dr. Armand Marie Leroi). 
35 See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 
(1985); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and 
Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 222–26 (2003). 
36 See discussion and accompanying notes infra Part III.B, III.D. 
37 In the 1970s and 1980s, such distinctions were invalidated for employment-related insurance benefits, 
leaving a discontinuity between insurance and annuity practices in the employment setting as compared to 
private insurance obtained outside of the employment setting.  See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax 
Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); L.A. Dept. of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).  
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pricing practices beginning after World War II.  As reinforced by developments during 
the following several decades, the use of race distinct mortality tables for pricing 
purposes could no longer be sustained by the major players in life insurance industry.   
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RACE CLASSIFICATIONS AND INSURANCE MARKETS 
¶17 In the decades preceding the Civil War, Americans began to view numbers as a 
“tool of mastery over both nature and society,” as pointed out by Drew Gilpin Faust in 
her study of the Civil War.38  Moreover, by the mid-nineteenth century Americans had 
“entered into what historian Patricia Cline Cohen has called ‘an infatuation with 
numbers.’”39  Such quantification, in which “statistics emerged in close alliance with 
notions of an expanding state,” often focused on “censuses, on demography, and on 
mortality records.”40   
¶18 Constructing categories for classifying data involved judgment in the choice of 
variables by which the data are sorted.  In antebellum America, race was a commonly 
used variable.41  For example, as noted by Cohen, the 1840 census distinguished lunatics 
and idiots by race but not by age, sex, or class “because it was assumed that race was the 
most salient division of the population.”42   
¶19 Because I focus primarily on the post-Civil War period, beginning with the end of 
Reconstruction and ending with the modern civil rights era, this Article does not examine 
in any detail the slavery-era history of American insurance and banking interests.  The 
resurgence of interest in black reparations has prompted new disclosures about the 
slavery-era practices of major American institutions, including insurance companies.43  
Insurance companies provided slaveholders coverage for damage to or death of their 
slaves at rates substantially higher than for white lives and imposed certain coverage 
restrictions, including confining policy amounts to two-thirds of actual value, and 
covering only a limited term of years.44  Although emancipation ended the slavery-era 
                                                 
38 DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 251 (2008). 
39 Id. (quoting COHEN, supra note 1, at 205).  
40 Id.  
41 COHEN, supra note 1, at 213.  
42 Id. at 212–13.  The preceding five censuses “had gradually departed from the Constitution’s bare 
requirement to count the total population, first by creating, then by progressively refining, categories based 
on age, sex, and color.”  Id. at 176–77; see also MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL 
HISTORY (1988).  The historical roots of a quantification, Cohen argues, reveal how the “concerns of the 
moment led to a reformulation, along numerical lines,” of a subject about which people were formerly 
“content to be imprecise.”  COHEN, supra note 1, at 207.  What people chose to measure “reveals not only 
what was important to them but what they wanted to understand and, often, what they wanted to control.”  
Id. at 206.  
43 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13810–13813 (requiring disclosure of slavery era insurance policies, effective in 
2001); ILL. INS. CODE § 155.39 (requiring disclosure of slavery era policies, effective in 2004).  The slavery 
era disclosures, summarized in reports compiled by state insurance departments, comprise a “slavery era” 
insurance registry. 
44 See generally Sharon Ann Murphy, Securing Human Property: Slavery, Life Insurance, and 
Industrialization in the Upper South, 25 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 615, 618 (2005) (observing that “the 
proportion of insurance policies on the lives of urban slaves in the Upper South approximated that of white 
male northeasterners by the mid-1850s” and that “fire insurance companies likewise began underwriting 
slave lives”).  A Baltimore life insurance company, which sold many slave policies through its Richmond 
office prior to the Civil War, charged double the rate they charged for white lives of the same age, confined 
policy amounts to two-thirds of actual value, and generally refused to insure for a term of more than seven 
years.  Id. at 623–24.  Although this company initially prohibited coverage of slaves engaged in certain 
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insurance business,45 race-based practices resurfaced in other life insurance markets 
following Reconstruction.46   
¶20 The Civil War focused attention on “the transience of life in the most dramatic 
possible way.”47  After the Civil War, many veterans, both black and white, and their 
survivors and dependents received benefits computed by reference to the veteran’s 
service entitlement, not by age or life expectancy, under an expanded federal Civil War 
pension system.48  Those included in the system received old age and survivors benefits 
comparable to pension and social insurance programs later adopted in Europe;49 however, 
many former slaves did not qualify for governmental benefits.50   
¶21 Private businesses also responded to the growing needs of American families for 
financial security in a period of rapid industrialization, social change, and increased 
                                                                                                                                                 
hazardous work, it later joined other companies in charging extra premiums for slaves engaged in 
hazardous occupations on steamboats, railroads, in coal pits or mines, or as engineers or firemen.  Id. at 
638–39, 645–46.  See also MILDRED F. STONE, SINCE 1845, A HISTORY OF THE MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY 19–20 (1957). 
45 Murphy, supra note 44, at 651; see The Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Lincoln in 
September, 1862, effective January 1, 1863; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery in 1865).  
46 State insurance department investigations and litigation have resulted in additional disclosure of post-
emancipation practices by insurance companies.  Some states have required more comprehensive disclosure 
of post-slavery race-based practices.  For example, in 2000, the State of New York Insurance Department 
directed each domestic and foreign life insurer and fraternal benefit society to review its past and current 
underwriting practices regarding race-based underwriting and to report its findings to the Department no 
later than August 15, 2000.  The Department specified that all relevant documents be included in such a 
review, including, but not limited to, rate charts, mortality tables, certain labor negotiation documents, 
agent and broker contracts, compensation schedules, underwriting and agent manuals, applications, policy 
form filings, board of directors (and committee) minutes, and internal memoranda.  Memorandum, 
Supplement No. 1 to Circular Letter No. 19, from State of New York Insurance Department to All Licensed 
Life Insurers and Fraternal Benefit Societies (June 22, 2000), available at 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/circltr/2000/cl00_19_s1_00.htm (issued pursuant to section 308 of the New 
York Insurance Law).   
After reviewing information provided pursuant to the disclosure requirements, state insurance departments 
have conducted more detailed examination of companies suspected of continuing race-based premium 
structures and underwriting procedures.  See, e.g., ACTUARIAL RESOURCES CORP., ACTUARIAL REPORT, 
RACE-BASED PRICING ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIFE INSURANCE BUSINESS OF WESTERN & 
SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (2003) (prepared for the Ohio Department of Insurance under 
guidelines and procedures established by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Race Based 
Premium Working Group).   
47 MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885–1910, at 7–8 (1963).  
48 E.g., FAUST, supra note 38, at 268 (noting that “executing its obligations to the dead and their mourners” 
through national cemeteries, pensions, and records that preserved identities “required a vast expansion of 
the federal bureaucracy and a reconceptualization of the government’s role”); THEDA SKOCPOL, 
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 102, 135–43 (1992) (noting that over several decades Civil War 
pensions “evolved from a restricted program to compensate disabled veterans and the dependents of those 
killed or injured in military service into an open-ended system of disability, old-age, and survivors’ benefits 
for anyone who could claim minimal service time on the northern side of the Civil War”).  Skocpol 
estimated that by 1910, about twenty-eight percent of all American men aged sixty-five or more received 
federal benefits averaging $189 a year, and over three hundred thousand widows, orphans, and other 
dependents were also receiving benefits.  Id. at 65.  Between 1880 and 1910, she notes, the federal 
government “devoted over a quarter of its expenditures to pensions distributed among the populace.”  Id.  
Survivor’s benefits were based on the veteran’s entitlement.  Id. at 107, 129.   
49 SKOCPOL, supra note 48, at 130–35, 134 tbl.3 (comparing average pensions in the United States, 
Germany, and Britain in 1910 and 1912). 
50 Id. at 135–38 (identifying the primary beneficiaries of Civil War pensions to be native-born and earlier- 
immigrant northerners, mostly from the middle classes, and stating that many workers and poor people 
were left out altogether).   
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economic vulnerability.  As a result, the American life insurance business expanded 
dramatically from the antebellum period through the Civil War. 51  A structure for state 
supervision of the industry also formed at about that time, with the establishment of 
insurance departments in Massachusetts in 1865,52 and the formation in 1871 of a 
National Convention of Insurance Commissioners.53  By 1873, twelve states had some 
form of insurance regulation.54   
¶22 Following the Civil War, race-based practices first emerged in a specialized form 
of life insurance marketed to low-income working people.  Beginning in the 1870s, 
newly formed American life insurance companies, including Prudential, Metropolitan 
Life, and John Hancock,55 known later as the “Big Three,”56 sold small individual 
policies to a growing market of low-income wage earners.57  This type of life insurance, 
called “industrial” or “burial” insurance, provided protection against the financial burden 
of a last illness and burial for the “industrious” classes.58   
¶23 Although rates and benefits varied by age, they did not vary, at least initially, by 
race of the insured, and were typically issued with fewer restrictions than other forms of 
life insurance.59  Policies covered poor workers and their families, including newly 
emancipated slaves, women, industrial workers, and their children.60  Industrial insurance 
agents typically sold policies door-to-door in an assigned geographical area or “debit,” 
                                                 
51 KELLER, supra note 47, at 2–11 (describing the reasons for the growth of the American life insurance 
enterprise from in the 1840s through the Civil War); see also SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, A CENTURY OF 
AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF THE MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, 1843–
1943, at 4–16 (1946). 
52 KELLER, supra note 47, at 194; see also discussion supra at note 22. 
53 KELLER, supra note 47, at 194. 
54 Id.  
55 The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company was formed during the Civil War, in 1862, several 
years prior to the other two companies.  HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, A HALF CENTURY COMPLETED, 1862–1912, at 18 
(1912) [hereinafter HISTORICAL SKETCH].  Although both Prudential and Metropolitan Life began business 
selling “industrial” insurance policies in the early 1870s, John Hancock did not sell industrial insurance 
(also referred to by the company as weekly premium insurance) until 1879.  Id. at 39, 76 (stating that the 
first “weekly premium” policy was issued by John Hancock on July 9, 1879).      
56 Although at least twenty different companies issued industrial insurance in 1905, Metropolitan, 
Prudential, and John Hancock accounted for ninety-five percent of this business, and industrial insurance 
constituted about seventeen percent of all life insurance.  See Roger L. Ransom & Richard Sutch, Tontine 
Insurance and the Armstrong Investigation: A Case of Stifled Innovation, 1868–1905, 47 J. OF ECON. HIST. 
379, 385 n.15 (1987).   
57 See discussion infra at Part III.B.   
58 American industrial insurance companies initially patterned their business on the Prudential Friendly 
Society of Great Britain, which grew out of the “friendly” and insurance societies developed in eighteenth 
and nineteenth century England.  MALVIN E. DAVIS, INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 6 
(1944).  In America, Prudential began in a basement in Newark in 1875 as the Prudential Friendly Society 
and two years later changed its name to the Prudential Insurance Company of America.  Metropolitan, 
which at that time provided life insurance for a mutual assistance and social organization for German 
immigrants, the Hildise Bund, began selling policies on the English Prudential model several years later.  
MARQUIS JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE, A STUDY IN BUSINESS GROWTH 43–44, 61, 73–93 (1947); see 
also John F. Dryden, President, The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Statement on “Industrial Insurance” Made 
to A Select Committee of the New Jersey Senate Appointed to Investigate Life Insurance 24 (July 19, 
1906).  See also discussion infra at Part III.   
59 See discussion infra at Part III.   
60 See discussion infra at Part III.B. 
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and collected premiums of a few cents each week to cover each insured member of the 
household.61   
¶24 By the beginning of the twentieth century, as observed by Louis Brandeis in his 
Progressive-era study of industrial insurance, industrial policies were “considered a prime 
necessity among the working people,” and constituted approximately three-fourths of 
then existing level premium life insurance policies.62  Industrial insurance remained an 
important form of life insurance for low-income wage earners until the mid-twentieth 
century, when the business began to decline.63  
¶25 After Reconstruction, Prudential and other newly formed industrial insurance 
companies began classifying former slaves as “excessive” mortality risks.64  Prudential 
introduced a race-distinct rate and benefit structure in 1881, followed later the same year 
by Metropolitan Life.65  Soon thereafter, certain states began prohibiting life insurance 
companies from charging race-differentiated rates.66  Prudential withdrew business from 
those states and later stopped soliciting black business everywhere.67  Metropolitan 
withdrew its business from states with anti-discrimination laws but continued to sell race 
distinct policies elsewhere.  Metropolitan later resumed business in states with anti-
discrimination laws, but adopted other less visible race-based practices in those 
markets.68  Black self-help organizations and black-owned insurance companies formed 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to respond to economic needs 
unmet by white companies.69  As a result, insurance markets became highly race-
segregated.  
¶26 As discussed in greater detail in Part III below, following improvements in living 
standards after World War II and the reforms sought by the Civil Rights Movement, 
insurance markets became more integrated, black insurance companies faced new 
competitive pressures, and explicit race-based rates for newly issued life insurance 
policies were rejected as a vestige of the Jim Crow past.70  By the 1970s, “ordinary” life 
insurance71 business had surpassed the industrial business for most major insurers.  The 
                                                 
61 DAVIS, supra note 58, at 7.   
62 See Louis D. Brandeis, Wage-Earners’ Life Insurance, COLLIER’S: THE NAT’L WKLY., Sept. 15, 1906, 
reprinted in ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY: A CASE STUDY IN THE WORKINGS OF 
DEMOCRACY 311, 312–13 APPENDIX II (1938) (proposing legislative reforms aimed at industrial insurance).  
Under level premium life insurance policies, premiums remain the same every year throughout the term of 
the contract but vary by the age at which the insured makes the contract with the insurer.  CLOUGH, supra 
note 51, at 13 (noting that level premium policies were introduced from England and established in 
America between 1843 and 1870).   
63 Despite its importance in proportion to overall numbers of policyholders, industrial insurance remained a 
small proportion of the dollar amount of insurance in force.  KELLER, supra note 47, at 286 tbl.11 (showing 
life insurance in force from 1900 to 1960, and comparing the amounts of ordinary and industrial life 
insurance in force during those years with credit and group insurance in force from 1920 to 1960).  
64 See discussion infra at Part III.B.1. 
65 Id. 
66 See discussion infra at Part III.B.2. 
67 Id. 
68 See discussion infra at Part III.B.3. 
69 See discussion infra at Part III.C. 
70 After newly issued policies with explicit race-based rates or benefits were eliminated, the battle to 
eliminate discriminatory practices in insurance then shifted to the more subtle ground of underwriting and 
“red-lining” issues.  See infra notes 260 and 291 and accompanying text. 
71 Ordinary life insurance policies were generally sold in increments of $1,000, with premiums payable by 
mail on a monthly or less frequent basis.  The premiums on ordinary life insurance policies were beyond 
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original “Big Three” discontinued selling new industrial policies, leaving the industrial 
market to smaller companies.72  Some of the remaining industrial companies did not 
revise their policies until the early 1980s, or later for a few small companies based in the 
South.73  A few Jim Crow era policies, issued with higher premiums or lower benefits for 
black policyholders, may remain in force even today.74 
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF RACE-BASED LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 
¶27 One of the first studies of race-based practices in the insurance industry to reach a 
wide audience was An American Dilemma,75 a comprehensive survey of American race 
relations cited by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.76  The Carnegie-
funded study,77 directed over a five-year period in the late 1930s and early 1940s by the 
Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal,78 examined the issue of race relations across a wide 
range of categories, including demographics, economics, politics, justice, social 
stratification, and social inequality.  Myrdal’s detailed analysis of the conflict between 
American democratic ideals and racism influenced a generation of judges79 and 
policymakers during World War II and the Cold War period.80   
¶28 In his analysis of the financial industry, Myrdal described how early mutual aid 
and benevolent societies81 and post-slavery race-based practices of major insurance 
                                                                                                                                                 
the economic reach of the poor and working class until living standards more generally improved in the 
later part of the twentieth century. 
72 ROBERT A. MARSHALL & ELI A. ZUBAY, THE DEBIT SYSTEM OF MARKETING LIFE AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE 24 (1975).    
73 Scott J. Paltrow, Past Due: In Relic of ‘50s and ‘60s, Blacks Still Pay More For a Type of Insurance—
Companies Ended Dual Rates on New ‘Burial Policies But Didn’t Fix Old Ones—‘White Risks’ & ‘Negro 
Risks’, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2000, at A1 (discussing investigation of five companies by Florida’s 
insurance department). 
74 As explained in Part III.B.4, although explicit race-based rates and benefits were largely eliminated for 
newly issued policies by the early 1980s, some African-Americans still pay higher premiums or receive 
lower benefits under race-differentiated policies issued in the past.  See cases cited infra notes 180–182.   
75 MYRDAL, supra note 2.  
76 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine of “separate but equal” and holding that race 
segregated public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Writing for 
the unanimous Court in Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren observed that segregation is usually interpreted 
as denoting inferiority and cited as support psychological studies published by Kenneth Clark and others, 
and more generally, Myrdal’s An American Dilemma.  Id. at 494 n.11. 
77 See F.P. Keppel, Foreword to MYRDAL, supra note 2, at v–viii (describing the genesis and scope of the 
study).  
78 See MYRDAL, supra note 2, at ix–xx.  Thirty years after his study was published, Myrdal was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974, shared with Friedrich August von Hayek, “for their pioneering work 
in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for their penetrating analysis of the interdependence 
of economic, social and institutional phenomena."  See Nobelprize.org, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1974, http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1974/ (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2009). 
79 Myrdal’s book was first cited by Justice Frankfurter in Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 
460, 463 (1950) (noting that “[d]iscrimination against Negroes in employment has brought a variety of 
legal issues before this Court in recent years” and citing cases and Myrdal’s An American Dilemma).   
80 See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–
1950, at 119 (1987); see also KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 355, 426; see generally MARY DUDZIAK, COLD 
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7–9, 79–114 (2000). 
81 MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 955.  Mutual aid and benevolent societies provided forms of self-help to their 
members.  They generally were funded through membership fees for the purpose of caring for the sick and 
providing burial at death.  E.g., JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK 
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companies led to the development of African-American owned and managed insurance 
companies.82  Although Myrdal’s summary goes into little detail of the use of race 
classifications by the insurance business, the underlying survey paper from which he 
drew his conclusions provides more background and context.83   
¶29 Additional historical information now available, and events occurring after the 
1944 publication of An American Dilemma, tell a story of the insurance business 
responding to legal and social changes over a period of more than a century.  Social and 
economic changes occurring after the publication of An American Dilemma, including the 
victory over the Nazi regime in World War II, pressure from the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund and other civil rights groups on the issue of race-based rates and benefits, as well as 
integration of economic markets more generally, led to changes in race-based insurance 
practices.   
A. Legal and Economic Context: After Reconstruction 
¶30 Many of the race-based practices of life insurance companies developed after 
Reconstruction, during a period of social and political retrenchment following the civil 
rights reforms of the 1860s and 1870s.  Shortly after the Civil War, during the short-lived 
Reconstruction era, Congress established the Freedman’s Bureau84 and enacted civil 
rights legislation.85  The financial panic of 1873, followed by a severe economic 
depression and political changes in the North, impeded further efforts at reconstruction in 
the South.86  After 1877, the federal government withdrew its troops from southern 
statehouses and federal supervision of elections ceased.87  Through a combination of 
terror and violence, including lynching,88 and various other less violent means such as 
poll taxes and literacy tests, white supremacists systematically disenfranchised blacks 
throughout the South.89   
                                                                                                                                                 
AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 109–10 (1991). 
82 See additional discussion infra in Part III.C. 
83 Ira DeA. Reid, The Negro in the American Economic System Vol. I 37–69 (1940) (unpublished 
manuscript prepared for the study, on file with the Schomburg Collection of the New York Public Library).  
84 Second Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866) (enacting a federal bureau to assist 
freedmen and refugees to enable them to become “self-supporting citizens of the United States, and to aid 
them in making the freedom conferred by proclamation of the commander-in-chief, by emancipation under 
the laws of the States, and by constitutional amendment, available to them and beneficial to the republic”).   
85 E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (mandating equal access to accommodations 
regardless of race); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (securing the rights of citizenship to 
all persons born in the United States and granting those citizens the same rights to enter into contracts as 
white citizens).  In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, civil rights litigators relied on the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to challenge race-based insurance rates.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982. 
86 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 190 (2005) 
[hereinafter FONER, FOREVER FREE].   
87 Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867) (establishing military rule over the Rebel 
States); see also, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 
575–87 (1988) [hereinafter FONER, RECONSTRUCTION] (describing the declining commitment of the federal 
government to reconstruction and withdrawal of federal troops after the Hayes-Tilden agreement of 1877).  
88 KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 3 (stating that by 1895, Booker T. Washington had acquiesced in black 
disenfranchisement and segregation and urged southern blacks to instead pursue education and economic 
advancement, and that from 1895–1900, an average of about one-hundred blacks were lynched a year, 
mostly in the South). 
89 E.g., FONER, FOREVER FREE, supra note 86, at 194–213; PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY 1619–
1877, at 229–36 (1993).  
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¶31 At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court, which had 
earlier issued restrictive rulings on post-Civil War constitutional amendments90 and civil 
rights legislation,91 upheld state Jim Crow laws in Plessy v. Ferguson.92  Plessy ushered 
in a period of state-sanctioned racial subordination that extended into the latter half of the 
twentieth century.93    
¶32 As discussed in greater detail below, the race-based practices developed by the 
industrial insurance industry mirrored the dominant racial ideology of white supremacy.  
Classifying blacks as inferior by “nature,” and thus as “substandard” insurance risks, 
race-distinct pricing structures became firmly entrenched in the insurance industry during 
the Jim Crow period.   
¶33 The era of state-sanctioned race segregation finally ended at least a decade after 
the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education94 with the social and legislative 
changes accomplished by the Civil Rights Movement during the second Reconstruction.95  
After a brief introductory discussion of related developments before the Civil War, this 
section focuses on the rise and fall of race-based insurance practices during the Jim Crow 
era.   
1. Before the Civil War: Self-Help for Free Blacks and Slaves 
¶34 In the late eighteenth century, church relief and mutual aid societies were 
organized by free blacks in the North, and later in the South, to provide a form of self-
help for themselves and their families in the event of sickness and death.96  Although 
mutual aid and benevolent societies had come into existence before the Revolution97 and 
were fairly common among master craftsmen, journeymen, and apprentices, white 
                                                 
90 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
91 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating portions of the civil rights act of 1875). 
92 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding separate facilities for blacks under the Fourteenth Amendment).  In 
rejecting the proposition that equal rights could be achieved through “an enforced commingling of the two 
races,” the Court observed that “[l]egislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish 
distinctions based on physical differences.”  Id. at 551.   
93 E.g., KLARMAN, supra note 10. 
94 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1945) (overturning Plessy’s "separate but equal" doctrine as a violation of equal 
protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).   
95 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Civil 
Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960); Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 
71 Stat. 634 (1957). 
96 ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR. & LINDA PICKTHORNE FLETCHER, NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN FINANCE:  A 
STUDY OF RACIAL POLICIES IN BANKING AND INSURANCE, VOL. II—STUDIES OF NEGRO EMPLOYMENT, 
APPENDIX A, HISTORY OF NEGRO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 124 (1970) [hereinafter FLETCHER, THE 
NEGRO IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY]; E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 368–69 
(1957); James B. Browning, The Beginnings of Insurance Enterprise Among Negroes, 22 J. OF NEGRO 
HIST. 417, 418, 420–24 (1937); George W. Hines & George Wm. Cook, No. 11 Negro Insurance, 
Commercial College Studies of Negroes in Business, 9 HOWARD U. RECORD 9 (1915); see PHILIP S. FONER, 
HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS 557 (1975) [hereinafter FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS] (stating 
that the first black mutual aid society was organized in Providence, Rhode Island, as early as 1780; 
providing details about Philadelphia’s “Free Africa Society,” organized in 1787 by Allen and Jones, 
including its appeal to the city to rent a portion of Philadelphia’s potter’s field for the burial of its dead; and 
describing the establishment of similar societies in New York and other Northern and Southern cities). 
97 See ROBERT A. MARSHALL & ELI A. ZUBAY, THE DEBIT SYSTEM OF MARKETING LIFE AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE 15 (1975).  
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benevolent and fraternal societies98 generally did not open their membership to blacks.99  
Blacks thus founded their own societies.100   
¶35 Black-founded societies served as centers of religious and social activity, and 
were important factors in the lives of free blacks101 and, to some extent, the slaves.102  
The societies collected small initiation fees and periodic payments.  Free black 
benevolent societies provided aid to the disabled or aged, as well as burial benefits and 
annuities for the survivors of deceased members.103   
¶36 The growth of benevolent organizations, along with black fraternal organizations 
and lodges,104 laid the foundation for the structure of the black insurance business.105  
                                                 
98 Although the differences have been labeled as “relatively minor,” mutual benefit (or benevolent) 
societies differed from fraternal societies in that “they lacked ritual and typically had only a local 
membership.”  DAVID M. FAHEY, THE BLACK LODGE IN WHITE AMERICA: “TRUE REFORMER” BROWNE 
AND HIS ECONOMIC STRATEGY 5 (1994) [hereinafter FAHEY, THE BLACK LODGE]. 
99 FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 96, at 557; Alvin Schmidt & Nicholas Babchuk, The 
Unbrotherly Brotherhood: Discrimination in Fraternal Orders, 34 PHYLON 275, 276–77 (1973); see also 
Mary Ann Clawson, Fraternal Orders and Class-Formation in the Nineteenth Century United States, 27 
COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 672, 692–93 (1985).  
100 One of the first black fraternal organizations was formed in 1776 by Prince Hall, of West Indian origin.  
FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 96, at 559–61.  In 1787, a warrant was granted to the 
Prince Hall freemasons to operate as African Lodge No. 459 by the Grand Lodge of England.  Id.  
American Masons refused to recognize the legitimacy of the all-black organization, however, and blacks 
were also barred from membership in white Masonic lodges.  Some white Masonic groups in America 
refuse to recognize the Prince Hall freemasons even today.  See, e.g., Shaila Dewan & Robbie Brown, 
Black Member Tests Message of Masons in Georgia Lodges, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2009, at A15 (stating that 
mainstream Masons began recognizing the Prince Hall group in about 1990, when “a thaw began in 
Connecticut and spread to all but 10 states” and noting that the hold-outs were mostly the former 
Confederate states, including Georgia); Black, White Masons in South Struggle with Racial Separation, 
MSNBC ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15405618/ (reporting that grand lodges in 
thirty-eight states, beginning in the late twentieth century, have granted mutual recognition to the Prince 
Hall masons but that Masons in North Carolina voted against granting such recognition in the fall of 2006; 
mutual recognition has not been granted by grand lodges in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia). 
101 MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 317 (noting that New Orleans had several hundred benevolent societies in the 
mid-1930s, one of which had been founded in the 1780s); Hines & Cook, supra note 96, at 8 (noting that a 
pamphlet issued by the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting Abolition of Slavery in 1838 listed eighty 
beneficial societies).   
102 Hines & Cook, supra note 96, at 7–8 (quoting from a 1904 Hampton Negro Conference Report: “While 
there are no records available, yet from reliable sources we learn that more than seventy-five years ago 
there existed in every city of any size in Virginia, organizations of Negroes having as their object the caring 
for the sick and the burying of the dead”).  
103 E.g., Robert L. Harris, Jr., Charleston’s Free Afro-American Elite: The Brown Fellowship Society and 
the Humane Brotherhood, 82 S. CAROLINA HIST. MAG. 289, 290 (Oct. 1981) (formed in 1790 and 1843, 
respectively, these societies provided sick and death benefits as well as burial plots and funeral services); 
see also FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 96, at 559.   
104 By 1860, black Masonic lodges could be found in eighteen states and in Canada.  See Edward Nelson 
Palmer, Negro Secret Societies, 23 SOC. FORCES 207, 208 (1944).  The Independent Order of Odd Fellows 
rejected the application for membership by a group of free blacks formed as the Philomathean Institute of 
New York.  Following its acceptance by an Odd Fellow lodge in England, the Philomathean Lodge in New 
York City was founded in 1843.  FRAZIER, supra note 96, at 371.  Black Odd Fellows lodges later became 
so widespread that W.E.B. DuBois observed that the Odd Fellows were the “most powerful and flourishing 
secret order” in America.  W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO 222, 224 (1899, reprinted in 1973 
ed.) (noting that fraternal organizations provided blacks certain social benefits as well as “insurance from 
misfortune”). 
105 FLETCHER, THE NEGRO IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY, supra note 96, at 124; see also JOHN HOPE 
FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 287 
(7th ed. 1994) (“A logical outcome of the mutual benefit societies was black insurance companies, which 
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Over time, benevolent societies and fraternal organizations declined in popularity, while 
life insurance sold by insurance companies grew in importance as a source of economic 
security.106   
2. After the Civil War: Economic Challenges 
¶37 In the post-Civil War period, newly emancipated blacks encountered serious 
social and economic challenges.107  After the Freedman’s Savings and Trust Company 
failed in 1874,108 many freed blacks became suspicious of banks as repositories for 
savings.109  Faced with poverty, illness, and the death of family members, emancipated 
blacks turned to churches and to fraternal and benevolent organizations for economic and 
social protection.110  Some former slaves also purchased coverage from industrial 
insurance companies selling small individual insurance policies designed for low-income 
wage earners.111   
¶38 The following three sections discuss the parallel development of race-based 
practices of white insurance companies and the organization and operation of twentieth 
century black-owned and managed insurance companies.  Black-owned life insurance 
companies developed from the experience with insurance programs provided by late 
nineteenth century black fraternal and benevolent societies.   
B. Industrial or “Debit” Insurance: Race-Based Rates and Sales Restrictions 
¶39 Black policyholders first became an important factor for major white insurance 
companies in the 1870s, the decade after emancipation.112  During that period, insurance 
companies began selling industrial policies, a life insurance business characterized by 
small policies and frequent premiums.113  Premiums were collected house-to-house in 
multiples of five or ten cents a week, with variations for different ages in the amount of 
insurance purchased.  Coverage could be purchased for every family member.114  
Sometimes referred to as “debit” insurance because premiums were collected by 
company representatives in an assigned fixed area known as a “debit,”115 industrial 
                                                                                                                                                 
were more economic than social in their functions.”).  These developments are discussed in greater detail 
infra at Part III.C. 
106 MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 955 (suggesting that one of the reasons for their decline in popularity was 
their frequent failure to pay sickness and death benefits, especially since the beginning of the depression in 
1929).  
107 E.g., FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 87; see also EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW 
SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION 132–59 (15th ed. 2007).  
108 FONER, FOREVER FREE, supra note 86, at 193. 
109 Id. 
110 C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE 244–49 (2003); MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 955 (noting that the death benefit and sickness 
insurance features of lodges and benevolent societies made the lodges “of almost equal importance with the 
churches in the period around 1890”). 
111 See introductory discussion of industrial insurance supra Part II. 
112 MARQUIS JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE: A STUDY IN BUSINESS GROWTH 338 (1947).   
113 FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 3 (1900) 
[hereinafter HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL]. 
114 DAVIS, supra note 58, at 6–7 (noting that children, ages one through ten, could be insured for as little as 
three cents per week).  
115 Id. (explaining that the agent would report premium payments in bulk and keep detailed records of 
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insurance served mainly to provide wage earners funds for a last illness and a decent 
burial.116  Because industrial insurance was within the reach of poorly paid workers, 
companies began selling insurance to former slaves.117   
1. Emergence of Race-Based Rates 
¶40 Both the Prudential Life Insurance Company, beginning in the mid-1870s,118 and 
Metropolitan Life, which issued its first industrial policy in 1879,119 initially issued such 
policies on blacks at the same rates as whites.120  By the beginning of 1881, however, 
Prudential had begun to charge higher premium rates to cover black children and reduced 
benefits of black adults by one-third to cover their “excessive” mortality.121  Metropolitan 
had stopped writing insurance on blacks,122 but resumed writing policies on blacks later 
in 1881 at two-thirds the benefits given whites.123   
2. Reaction to Early State Laws Prohibiting Race-Based Insurance Rates 
¶41 In response to these developments, Massachusetts passed a law in 1884 
forbidding race-based life insurance rates or benefits.124  According to Metropolitan’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
premium payments on individual policies issued to each family).  The novelist Philip Roth, in a memoir 
published after his father’s death, describes childhood memories of hearing of his father’s work collecting 
door-to-door on a “colored debit,” stories “of the eerie evenings collecting pennies from the poorest of 
Newark’s poor, stories from thirty-eight years with the Metropolitan.”  PHILIP ROTH, PATRIMONY, A TRUE 
STORY 108–09 (1991).  I’m grateful to my colleague, Professor Shari Motro, for this reference.   
116 See Brandeis, supra note 62, at 311, app. II at 312–13.  Brandeis argued that industrial insurance placed 
an undue burden on working people through the companies’ high management expenses, high lapse rates, 
and premiums double that payable for any given amount payable on ordinary life nonparticipating policies.  
Id. at 314–15.  Brandeis also urged the establishment of “savings bank life insurance” to take the place of 
industrial insurance.  Id.   
117 JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.   
118 Reid, supra note 83, at 38; see also HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 1, 58. 
119 JAMES, supra note 112, at 87.  The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company also began selling 
industrial insurance policies at that time.  Both companies were already selling ordinary life insurance 
policies.  DAVIS, supra note 58, at 6. 
120 JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.  In a prospectus of Prudential, which contained the first adult rate table 
used by the company (covering ages eleven to seventy-five), benefits were limited to a maximum of $25 
per week for sickness and $500 in case of death.  No medical examination was necessary.  HOFFMAN, 
HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 70–71, 73.   
121 See HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 137–38.  Hoffman’s study reproduces a 
memorandum issued in March of 1881, by John F. Dryden, Secretary of the Prudential, in which he 
instructed agents that two changes would be made “with respect to colored persons (Negroes) applying for 
insurance in this company” under policies issued on and after March 28, 1881: 1) “Under adult policies the 
sum assured will be one-third less than now granted for the same weekly premium”; and 2) “Under 
infantile policies, the amount insured will be the same as now, but the weekly premiums will be increased 
to five cents.”  Id. at 137.  The changes were “in consequence of the excessive mortality prevailing in the 
class above named” and that “rate tables would be sent to them for use with colored applicants.”  Id.  
Hoffman’s study also contains the “Adult Rate Table for Colored Risks,” first used April 4, 1881.  Id. at 
138. 
122 JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.   
123 Id. at 86 (describing that this practice, dictated entirely by the greater mortality risk of “colored 
persons,” was misconstrued as racial discrimination “in the face of proof that color had nothing to do with 
it”). 
124 SUPPLEMENT TO THE PUBLIC STATUTES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 235, §1 
(1884), provided as follows: “No life company shall make any distinction or discrimination between white 
persons and colored persons wholly or partly of African descent, as to the premiums or rates charged for 
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historian, “[a]fter unavailing protests the companies discontinued soliciting Negro risks 
in that state.”125  When several other states passed similar laws,126 “Prudential went 
further and stopped doing business with Negroes everywhere.”127  The laws could not 
require the companies to solicit black business, as pointed out by a historian writing 
about the companies’ reaction, and “most companies, Metropolitan included, instructed 
their agents not to solicit it in those states.”128   
¶42 By contrast, other coverage restrictions were significantly liberalized during this 
era.129  Prudential discontinued restrictions on hazardous occupations, except for military 
                                                                                                                                                 
policies upon the lives of such persons; nor shall any such company demand or require greater premiums 
from such colored persons than are at that time required by such company from white persons of the same 
age, sex, general condition of health and prospect of longevity; nor shall any such company make or require 
any rebate, diminution or discount upon the amount to be paid on such policy in case of the death of such 
colored person insured . . . . Any such company which shall refuse the application of any such colored 
person for insurance upon such person’s life shall furnish such person, on his request therefore, with the 
certificate of a regular examining physician of such company who made the examination, stating that such 
refusal was not because such applicant is a person of color, but solely upon such grounds of the general 
health and prospect of longevity of such person as would be applicable to white persons of the same age 
and sex.” 
 Three years later, the statute was recodified and amended to add the following additional language at the 
end of the first sentence above: “nor insert in the policy any condition, nor make any stipulation whereby 
such person insured shall bind himself or his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns to accept any sum 
less than the full value or amount of such policy in case of a claim accruing thereon by reason of the death 
of such person insured, other than such as are imposed upon white persons in similar cases; and any such 
stipulation or condition so made or inserted shall be void.”  SUPPLEMENT TO THE PUBLIC STATUTES OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 215, § 69 (1887). 
125 JAMES, supra note 112, at 338. 
126 Id. at 338 n.70 (listing Connecticut, 1887; Ohio, 1889; New York, 1891, Michigan, 1893; Minnesota, 
1895; New Jersey, 1902; Rhode Island, which had a law by 1894 but repealed it before 1906); see also 
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 70 (1940). 
127 JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.  According to Hoffman’s account, published in 1900, although 
Prudential “accepts applications from negroes and issues policies without rating, it does not solicit this 
class of risks, and has, therefore, comparatively few colored persons as policyholders on its books.” 
HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 139.  He refers readers to his “full discussion 
of the entire subject of negro mortality” in his book on the race traits and tendencies of the American 
Negro, published in 1896.  Id.  
128 JAMES, supra note 112, at 86.  Few historical details are available about the early race-based policies of 
the other member of the “Big Three,” the John Hancock Company, which was the first mutual life company 
to issue an industrial insurance policy.  However, a consulting actuary who served as an expert witness for 
the company, reported after reviewing company records that John Hancock did not develop dual rate plans; 
instead, the company established a practice of not soliciting black business and not paying sales 
commissions on African-American policies.  According to the report, the company did not begin to solicit 
African-American business until sometime around 1953, and after that time paid full sales commissions for 
African-Americans and whites for either ordinary or industrial policies.  The company thereafter monitored 
the percentage of sales to African-Americans.  The expert reported that a total of about seventy million 
industrial policies were sold by John Hancock through 1967, when it discontinued selling industrial 
policies.  About 550,000 policies of that total were sold to African-Americans during that time, with about 
400,000 sold from 1954 to 1967.  See generally Expert Witness Report of Randall Mire, Norflet v. John 
Hancock Fin. Services, Inc. and John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 04-1099 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2007) (rulings 
on motion to compel discovery). 
129 Industrial policies were generally less restrictive than ordinary policies, except that initially, adult 
weekly premium policies contained standard terms (applicable also to the ordinary branch) that “in case of 
death by the hands of justice or the consequences of violating or attempting to violate law, or in 
consequence of habits of intemperance, existing at the policy date or acquired afterwards, the policy could 
be avoided.”  See HISTORICAL SKETCH, supra note 55, at 78.  These conditions were dropped for industrial 
policies issued by the company after July of 1884.  Id.  See also DAVIS, supra note 58, at 9–10 (discussing 
more generally these types of restrictive clauses in early industrial policies).  
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service, in 1884.130  It briefly eliminated the military service restriction at the end of the 
century.  Neither Prudential nor Metropolitan charged higher rates for members of the 
armed forces during the Spanish-American War.131   
¶43 Metropolitan, unlike Prudential, continued selling to blacks at higher rates in 
states that did not prohibit race-differentiated rates.132  Although Metropolitan continued 
to sell policies to blacks, careful selection of black risks was “deemed necessary,” and “a 
full medical examination” was required in every case.133  Under those special selection 
conditions, Metropolitan decided in 1894 that the higher rates for black risks could be 
discontinued, and blacks were again sold policies at the same premium as whites.134  At 
the same time, solicitation of business in states with anti-discrimination laws resumed.135   
3. The Influence of Race Ideology: Standard and Substandard Policies 
¶44 In 1896, the year of the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,136 
Prudential’s statistician, Frederick Hoffman, a German immigrant who had married into a 
southern white family and lived for a time in the South,137 published a study of black 
mortality rates.138  He found that black mortality rates for most age groups were nearly 
twice those of whites and that at all age groups blacks had a lower life expectancy than 
whites.139  Although Hoffman’s later work tied the prevalence of certain diseases in the 
general population, such as cancer and tuberculosis, to social, economic, and 
environmental conditions, he did not similarly attribute black mortality to such 
conditions.140   
¶45 Hoffman argued instead that black mortality and black health were the function of 
innate racial traits of blacks, concluding that the numbers proved that blacks were 
biologically inferior to whites, and attributed the statistics to their “low state of 
                                                 
130 HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 155.  Prudential industrial policyholders 
included, among other occupations, bartenders, blacksmiths, machinists, carpenters, railway employees, 
and miners.  Id. at 304 (noting industrial policyholders dying in 1897 and 1898).  In 1898, Prudential was 
insuring, among many other occupations, nearly 18,000 miners, 16,000 machinists, 30,000 carpenters, and 
113,000 laborers on industrial policies.  Id. at 306.  It is not clear from Hoffman’s description of the change 
in policy whether or not hazardous occupations were at that time treated by Prudential as substandard risks 
subject to rates different from standard risks.    
131 KELLER, supra note 47, at 55–56 (describing the liberalization of policy terms from the 1870s to the 
1890s).   
132 JAMES, supra note 112, at 338. 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  See also WINFRED OCTAVUS BRYSON, JR., NEGRO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL EXPERIENCE OF NEGRO LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANIES 8 (1948) (listing 1893 as the year that Metropolitan Life equalized the benefits for colored and 
white risks).  
135 JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.  
136 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (sanctioning “Jim Crow laws”).  
137 See Paul Finkelman, Introduction to FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, RACE TRAITS AND TENDENCIES OF THE 
AMERICAN NEGRO i–vii (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2004) (1896) [hereinafter HOFFMAN, RACE 
TRAITS].  
138 Id. at v (describing in the preface his ten-year investigation of “longevity and physiological peculiarities 
among the colored population”).  In Hoffman’s view, his study would not be in vain if it led to “more 
scientific attention to the relations between the superior and inferior races.”  Id. at viii. 
139 Id. at iv.  
140 Id. at ii–vi.  
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morality.”141  He wrote that “modern educational and philanthropic efforts” had made 
blacks even more “dependent on the white man” than slavery, and rejected the idea that 
private charity or public programs could change the social condition of blacks.142  He 
viewed blacks as a dying race, and accordingly, not good insurance risks.143  Hoffman’s 
mortality studies also provided a “scientific” justification for race discrimination more 
generally.144   
¶46 In 1907, new industrial mortality tables were adopted,145 and the underlying data 
showed that black mortality rates were substantially in excess of white mortality rates.146  
Rather than continue to write policies on the same premium rates, which the Metropolitan 
historian noted, “would have been discrimination against the whites,” the company 
adopted a new policy.147  A set of plans were prepared “on a basis providing for extra 
mortality, with cash values computed on [] special tables and dividends based on the   
actual mortality experience,” along with a line of plans for persons of standard 
mortality.148  When a black person was issued a standard policy rather than a policy for 
substandard risks, the extra mortality was taken into account by allowing no issue 
commission to the agent.149   
¶47 As a result, race and age again became major defining classifications for 
Metropolitan in computing rates and benefits provided under the policies.  At that time, 
insurance company experience showed comparable or greater mortality rate differentials 
at certain ages when industrial policyholders were classified by gender,150 as by race.151  
                                                 
141 Id. at vi. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at vi.  In addition, Professor Finkelman notes that there is “some evidence that some southern white 
politicians used Hoffman’s work to argue for black disfranchisement.”  Id. at iv. 
145 Prior to 1907, industrial companies based their premium rates on mortality tables compiled by individual 
companies from their own experience.  HENRY MOIR, ET AL., SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
PRINCIPAL MORTALITY TABLES 40 (1919), available at 
http://www.archive.org/stream/sourcesandchara00wolfgoog#page/n4/mode/1up.  The valuation of 
industrial policies for regulatory purposes, on the other hand, was based on the tables used for ordinary 
policies, the Actuaries, or Combined Experience for policies issued prior to 1901 and the American 
Experience Table for policies issued after 1900.  Id.  After modification of New York state laws in 1906, 
the Superintendent of Insurance for New York State adopted a table, based exclusively on the experience of 
industrial policies, for regulation of industrial companies.   
 The Standard Industrial Mortality Table was based on the 1896–1906 experience of the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company in records classified according to the year of issue and the age at entry.  Id.  The 
rate of mortality shown by the table is lower than the American Experience table “from ages 10 to 21, then 
higher to age 87 inclusive; and at the very old ages it of necessity becomes lower again” because of the 
limit of life in the American Experience table.  Id. at 41.   
146 JAMES, supra note 112, at 339.   
147 Id. 
148 Id.  See also NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEED FOR A 
NEW MORTALITY TABLE AND RELATED TOPICS 87 (June 21, 1939) (stating that the mortality tables used for 
valuation purposes by companies writing the most business was then the Standard Industrial Table, with a 
Sub-Standard Industrial Table used for “special classes and sub-standard risks,” but that many of the 
smaller companies still used the American Experience Table, which did not produce “sufficiently high 
margins at ages over 40”). 
149 JAMES, supra note 112, at 339.   
150 For example, the industrial mortality experience for Prudential policyholders at the end of the nineteenth 
century was more favorable for women ages twenty-five through fifty-four than for men at the same ages.  
HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 311 (noting the industrial mortality experience 
between 1891–1898 for white males and females, particularly the proportion of deaths at various ages).  An 
early twentieth century mortality study conducted by Metropolitan Life found greater mortality of white 
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However, despite those mortality differentials, the industrial companies did not adopt 
gender differentiated premiums or benefits.  White men were generally treated more 
favorably as a group for pricing purposes than white women, who had lesser average 
mortality than white men at many age ranges, or than black women, who had average 
mortality nearly comparable to that of white men at certain age ranges.152  Accordingly, 
despite men’s greater average mortality risk when compared to women, men other than 
black men were not generally treated as “substandard” risks for life insurance.  The 
companies thus treated white men as the “norm” for standard pricing purposes. 
¶48 The 1907 industrial mortality table remained in general use until 1948.153  In the 
early 1940s, a new updated industrial table was created.154  At that time, a separate 
“substandard” table was also constructed.155  As described by a leading insurance 
textbook, the substandard table was “for the use of companies that write predominantly 
Negro lives.”156  A study of mortality rates experienced by industrial companies 
published prior to adoption of the new tables showed overall improvement in mortality 
for both blacks and whites.  The race differential remained, however, averaging eighty-
three percent higher than white mortality, but well over twice as high at certain ages.157   
                                                                                                                                                 
males than white females at all ages.  LOUIS I. DUBLIN, ET AL., MORTALITY STATISTICS OF INSURED WAGE-
EARNERS AND THEIR FAMILIES:  EXPERIENCE OF THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
INDUSTRIAL DEPARTMENT, 1911–1916, in THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 4 (1919) (observing that 
47.8% of Metropolitan’s insured lives were white females and 12.5% were “colored policyholders,” of 
which slightly more than half were female).  Beginning with the age period of twenty to twenty-four years, 
the excess of white male over white female mortality was over thirteen percent; between twenty-five and 
thirty-four years, white males showed a mortality rate thirty-eight percent in excess of the rate for white 
females; between thirty-five and forty-four years, was “the maximum point of excess in the mortality of 
white males over that of white females, namely over seventy-two per cent [sic].”  Id. at 20.  The relative 
excess of white male mortality began to decline after that age period, but never approached a figure nearer 
than twelve percent at the highest significant age period in the study.  Id. at 21.   
151 See DUBLIN, supra note 150, at 15.  The excess mortality rate for black males was highest for ages 
fifteen to twenty-four years, over twice the rate for white males.  Id. at 16.  Between twenty-five and thirty-
four years, black males showed a mortality rate fifty-four percent in excess of the rate for white males; 
between thirty-five and forty-four years, twenty percent in excess of the rate for white males; between 
forty-five to sixty-four years, sixteen to seventeen percent in excess of the rate for white males; between 
sixty-five to seventy-four, an excess of nearly six percent; and after age seventy-five, the rate of mortality 
for white males exceeded that of black males.  Id. at 16 tbl.7 (“Mortality from All Causes of Death 
Combined: White Males and Colored Males Compared, Death Rates per 1,000 Persons Exposed, 1911–
1916”).   
152 Although the death rate of black men was higher than for black women at all ages between ages twenty-
five and seventy-five (with lower mortality among black males than black females from ages five to 
twenty-four), the excess was never more than twenty percent, and thus, the excess was more moderate than 
that observed between white men and women.  Id. at 21–22.  
153 DAN M. MCGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 149 (rev. ed. 1967).   
154 This table was known as the 1941 Standard Industrial Table and was constructed based on the industrial 
experience of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for the period 1930–1939.  Id.   McGill describes 
industrial insurance as follows: “It is sold to the lower income groups, with no medical examination, many 
of the policyholders being employed in hazardous or unhealthful occupations and living in the less 
desirable neighborhoods.  Moreover, a large percentage of the policyholders are Negroes, particularly in the 
South.  As a result, the death rate among industrial policyholders is considerably higher than that among 
ordinary insureds; and special mortality tables must be used in the calculation of premiums, reserves, and 
surrender values.”  Id.  
155 This table was known as the 1941 Substandard Industrial Mortality Table.  Id. at 150. 
156 Id. (pointing out that no table is prescribed by law for calculation of minimum reserves or cash surrender 
values for substandard insurance, but that the regulatory authorities usually review and approve the basis 
actually used).  
157 A study of mortality rates experienced by industrial insurance companies published prior to the adoption 
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4. Equalizing Rates and Benefits and the Adoption of Race-Merged Tables 
¶49 From the mid to late 1930s, Metropolitan and other white insurance companies 
had been under increasing pressure from the civil rights community to end their race-
based practices in various markets.158  In 1947, the United Office and Professional 
Workers of America, a union affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organization 
(CIO), began a campaign against race discrimination in insurance by writing letters to 
Metropolitan, the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination, the National Urban League, 
the NAACP, and state insurance commissioners around the country, reporting the results 
of its survey finding that black applicants were restricted in certain cases to substandard 
forms of insurance and that limitations were put on commissions to agents.159   
¶50 For Metropolitan, the rates for policies issued under the new industrial mortality 
tables were more favorable than the rates on policies issued under both the former 
standard and substandard industrial policies.  In 1948, the company began equalizing the 
future death benefits on all existing premium paying and paid-up industrial policies, and 
eliminated substandard risk plans prospectively.160  In 1963, guaranteed nonforfeiture 
values on premium paying industrial policies were also increased for older policies in the 
same proportion.161   
¶51 In the early 1960s, a new “race-merged” or “integrated” industrial table, the 
Commissioners 1961 Standard Industrial Mortality Table, was developed and constructed 
from the 1954–1958 mortality experience of white males and females from eighteen 
companies.162  Rather than produce separate standard and substandard tables, 
“[s]ubstantial margins were introduced into the basic data to allow for difference in 
company underwriting standards and the racial composition of the policyholder group,” 
with the level of margins determined “in part by an examination of the experience for the 
same period of eleven smaller companies, as well as some combined white and nonwhite 
data.”163   
                                                                                                                                                 
of the new tables reported general improvement in industrial mortality experience for both white and black 
lives, with greatest improvement at infantile ages and greater overall improvement than was shown by the 
ordinary insurance experience.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY 
THE NEED FOR A NEW MORTALITY TABLE AND RELATED TOPICS 91 (June 21, 1939) (observing that 
“mortality on colored lives improved considerably during the thirteen year period, but it remained at 
approximately the same level as compared to white industrial mortality, for the latter improved also,” and 
reporting that “[c]olored mortality averaged 83% higher than white, but at the important insurance ages 
between 10 and 40 it was well over twice as high”).  Id.   
158 Also see the discussion of pressures by civil rights groups on their “ordinary” insurance divisions infra 
at Part III.D. 
159 Report of Henry M. McKiven, Ph.D., Norflet v. John Hancock Financial Services Inc. and John 
Hancock Life Insurance Co., No. 04-1099 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2007) (rulings on motion to compel 
discovery).  McKiven cites an article in the Amsterdam News dated April 26, 1947, reporting that the union 
demanded that insurance be sold to “colored applicants on the basis of their insurability without restrictions 
on the grounds of color” and that “agents be compensated for the sale of insurance to colored applicants on 
the same basis as for the sale of insurance to white applicants.”  Id. 
160 See N.Y. INS. DEP’T, REPORT ON EXAMINATION OF METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
REGARDING RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 19, at 16–17 (Mar. 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter N.Y. INS. DEP’T, REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE]. 
161 Id. at 17. 
162 MCGILL, supra note 153, at 160. 
163 Id. at 160–61.   
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¶52 In its report to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners on the 
development of the proposed new table,164 the industry advisory committee noted the 
difficulty of determining suitable margins when developing a valuation table for general 
use throughout the country.165  The report observed that it had been common practice in 
the past to price policies by race.166  However, the report also noted “a greater tendency” 
to depart from past practice:   
In the past, it has been common practice to use substandard rates and 
values for non-white lives, and many companies still follow this practice.  
While the evidence which your Committee has developed demonstrates 
conclusively an improvement in Industrial Mortality on standard lives 
over the past twenty-five years, there is a greater tendency for companies 
to use the same policy forms, valuation and non-forfeiture bases, etc., for 
non-white as for white business and, in many companies, there is an 
increasing proportion of Industrial business written on non-white lives.  It 
is conceivable, therefore, that Industrial mortality, overall, in the future 
may not improve but may, in fact, become higher.  In their deliberations 
on the appropriate level of loading, the Committee, therefore gave some 
consideration as to what the level of mortality in the valuation table should 
be to cover experience of the companies on all of their Industrial business, 
white and non-white combined.167 
                                                 
164 REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE INDUSTRIAL MORTALITY TABLE 
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE N.A.I.C., in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE 
COMMISSIONERS, 92ND ANNUAL MEETING 521–43 (1961) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE] (noting that “[i]n Executive Session it was voted to accept the report and postpone 
any action until the December [1961] meeting,” so that there would be “ample opportunity for the 
companies to study the report, and for adequate discussion by the Actuaries”).  The Superintendent of 
Insurance for the State of New York and Chair of the Industrial Table Study Subcommittee of the Life 
Insurance Committee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Thomas Thacher, appointed 
an Industry Advisory Committee of company actuaries to work with the technicians of the insurance 
departments to develop a modern mortality table to replace the 1941 Commissioners Standard Industrial 
Mortality Table.  The Industry Advisory Committee was comprised of actuaries from six life insurance 
companies, including the Colonial Life Insurance Company of America, the National Life and Accident 
Insurance Company, the American National Insurance Company, the Commonwealth Life Insurance 
Company, the Life Insurance Company of Georgia, and the Western and Southern Life Insurance 
Company.  See INDUSTRIAL MORTALITY TABLE STUDY SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 91ST ANNUAL MEETING 535 (1960) (reporting on 
the formation and membership of the Industry Advisory Committee and on the plans for the project agreed 
upon at a meeting attended by members of the Industry Advisory Committee and of the Technicians’ 
Committee, comprised of representatives of the Insurance Departments of California, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania). 
165 REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 164, at 525. 
166 Id. 
167 Id.  See also William C. Brown, A Proposed New Industrial Valuation Table, 13 TRANSACTIONS OF 
SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES 457 (1960), available at http://www.soa.org/library/research/transactions-of-society-
of-actuaries/1961/january/tsa61v13pt1n37ab27.pdf.  The Industry Advisory Committee collected 
information from all industrial companies with at least $50 million of outstanding life insurance in force in 
1958, including data on the proportions of nonwhite and female business.  Id. at 457.  The industry 
committee assumed that if business were issued on a “substandard” basis, a different valuation table could 
be used with the permission of state authorities, and thus, a separate “substandard” table need not be 
prepared.  Id. at 469–70. 
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¶53 Although industrial insurance remained an important form of insurance for private 
insurance companies at least into the 1950s,168 the industrial business began to decline 
thereafter.169  In the first half of the twentieth century, the increased wages of workers led 
to an expanding market of potential policyholders as well as a gradual merging of the 
industrial and group insurance markets.170  Thus, companies increasingly aimed their 
marketing efforts at members of the middle class.171  
¶54 As incomes of workers increased, they could more often afford to purchase 
intermediate, ordinary, or other forms of insurance that provided greater coverage than 
industrial policies.172  By the late 1960s, Metropolitan, Prudential, and John Hancock, 
formerly known as the “Big Three,” had discontinued writing new industrial policies,173 
and held only about thirty percent of the industrial insurance in force at the end of 
1970.174  Of the remaining companies selling industrial insurance, as well as ordinary life 
insurance, most were located and principally operated in the southeast United States.175  
Of the companies selling industrial insurance exclusively, many were located in 
Louisiana because of specific provision under Louisiana state law for the operation of 
burial insurance and industrial companies.176 
¶55 Civil rights litigation in Louisiana,177 involving nearly three hundred companies 
that sold industrial policies over a fifty to sixty-five year period during the twentieth 
century,178 reveals the continuing impact of prior race-based practices in the industrial 
insurance market.179  Although facts that developed in the course of the litigation indicate 
                                                 
168 In 1948, it was estimated that of the seventy-eight million insurance policyholders in the United States, 
about two-thirds of them owned industrial policies.  Malvin E. Davis, Modern Industrial Life Insurance, in 
LIFE INSURANCE TRENDS AT MID-CENTURY 115 (David McCahan ed., 1950).   
169 MCGILL, supra note 153, at 715–16.   
170 See, e.g., id. at 715. 
171 Id. 
172 MARSHALL & ZUBAY, supra note 97, at 23.  By that time, the “Big Three” industrial companies had been 
selling ordinary insurance for many years.  See KELLER, supra note 47, at 20–21 (noting that “Prudential 
created an ordinary insurance branch in 1886 which did 3 percent of the company’s business in 1890 and 
37 percent by 1905,” that Metropolitan revived its ordinary business in 1892, and that John Hancock did so 
in 1902).  
173 MARSHALL & ZUBAY, supra note 97, at 23–24. 
174 Id. at 33. 
175 Id. at 39.   
176 Id. at 28, 34 n.5.  Of 161 companies reporting industrial insurance policies in force at the end of 1970, 
only 10 for which information was available wrote industrial policies exclusively.  Id. at 34. 
177 See In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004) (class certification issue), cert. denied, 
125 S.Ct. 277 (2004).  The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund has participated in the litigation as 
amicus curiae.   
178 Three insurance companies are defendants in the consolidated litigation.  Over the years, each of the 
companies acquired other companies and assumed blocks of in-force insurance issued by them.  The 
Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the actions against the insurance companies and 
transferred them to the Eastern District of Louisiana for pretrial proceedings.  Id. at 412.  
179 The Fifth Circuit opinion in Monumental Life Ins. Co. reversed and remanded the district court’s denial 
of plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).  Id. at 421.  The plaintiffs sought 
certification of a class comprised of “all African-Americans who own, or owned at the time of policy 
termination, an industrial life insurance policy that was issued as a substandard plan or at a substandard 
rate.”  Id. at 413.  The plaintiffs limited the class to “industrial policies sold at a substandard (i.e., higher) 
rate for African-Americans and a lower rate for Caucasians, or as a substandard plan (i.e., a more costly 
plan) for African-Americans and a corresponding less expensive plan for Caucasians.”  Id. at 414.  
Plaintiffs define industrial life insurance policies as “(1) policies labeled as ‘industrial’ or (2) those policies 
with a face amount of less than $2,000.00 and weekly or month home premium collection.”  Id. 
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that none of the companies sold policies with race-based premiums or race-based benefits 
after the early 1970s,180 many older policies still remained in force.181  Beginning in 
1988, some insurers voluntarily adjusted premiums and/or benefits to equalize the 
amount of coverage per premium dollar, but some policies were terminated without 
adjustment, and other existing policies were not adjusted.182  Some policies sold in the 
Jim Crow era containing racially unequal premiums or benefits thus remained in force in 
the twenty-first century.   
¶56 During the last decade, certain states have required disclosure of historical race-
based practices of companies licensed to do business in their states.183  Although some 
states have focused their investigations on slavery-era practices, other state regulators, 
including the New York State Insurance Department, have required disclosure of post-
slavery and twentieth century practices.184  Following those disclosures and follow-up 
investigations, several major life insurers, including Metropolitan and Prudential, settled 
class action lawsuits alleging racially discriminatory past practices in the industrial 
insurance market.185  
C. Black Self-Help After the Civil War 
¶57 As the race-based policies of white insurance companies186 in the late nineteenth 
century evolved, black fraternal and benevolent societies187 added insurance features to 
their benefit programs.188  This section describes the development of an innovative 
fraternal insurance program189 that led to development of a major black insurance 
                                                 
180 Other cases have involved race-based practices that were discontinued as late as the year 2000.  See, 
e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of class 
certification of approximately 1.4 million African-American policyholders). 
181 The number of policies in force is in dispute.  The plaintiffs in Monumental Life Ins. Co. estimated that 
over 4.5 million of the 5.6 million industrial policies issued by defendants remained in force; many other 
policies have been terminated, surrendered, or paid-up without remediation. 365 F.3d at 416.  However, 
defendants’ expert estimated that the ratio of terminated policies to outstanding policies is approximately 
five-to-one, leaving slightly more than one million policies remaining in force.  Id.   
182 Plaintiffs claimed violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, and sought the following relief:  1) an 
injunction prohibiting the collection of discriminatory premiums; 2) reformation of policies to equalize 
benefits; and 3) restitution of past premium overcharges or benefit underpayments.  In re Monumental Life 
Ins. Co., 365 F.3d at 412–13.  
183 See discussion supra Parts I, II, particularly at notes 9 and 46.  As described in greater detail there, some 
disclosures by companies have been required under state law (slavery-era registers).  Some state insurance 
departments have conducted investigations of individual companies under procedures established by a 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) working group on race-based premiums 
following the results of a survey of life insurers published by NAIC in 1988.  
184 See discussion supra Parts I, II. 
185 See supra note 4.    
186 See discussion supra Part III.B.  By the early part of the twentieth century, as reported by Louis 
Brandeis, about ninety-four percent of all industrial insurance in the United States was furnished by three 
companies: Metropolitan of New York at forty-nine percent, Prudential of New Jersey at thirty-six percent, 
and John Hancock of Massachusetts at nine percent.  Each company also issued ordinary life policies. 
Brandeis, supra note 62, at 313. 
187 A mutual benefit (benevolent) society could evolve into a fraternal society, which tended to have rituals 
and a broader membership base.  FAHEY, supra note 98, at 5 (noting that in the late nineteenth century most 
fraternal societies provided life insurance). 
188 See Reid, supra note 83, at 40–42.   
189 See generally KELLER, supra note 47, at 10–11 (explaining that “the great age of the fraternals began in 
the 1870’s [sic], and they grew with the ensuing decades of industrialization and immigration until by 1895 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  L A W  A N D  S O C I A L  PO L I C Y  [ 2 0 0 9  
 
384 
company.  It focuses on the story of one fraternal organization as an example of the type 
of economic and racial dynamics that led to significant segregation of markets during the 
Jim Crow era.   
1. Black Fraternal and Benevolent Societies 
¶58 One of the largest and most successful black benevolent organizations, the Grand 
Fountain, United Order of the True Reformers (hereinafter “True Reformers”), was 
formed in 1881, and headquartered in Richmond, Virginia.190  The True Reformers, 
described by Booker T. Washington as “one of the first large secret orders formed by 
Negroes,”191 and by W.E.B. Du Bois as “probably the most remarkable Negro 
organization in the country,”192 established an extensive insurance program.193  Between 
its founding and the year it failed, its lodges paid out to its members nearly three million 
dollars in sick and death benefits.194  
¶59 Organized by a former slave named William Washington Browne,195 the True 
Reformers developed out of Browne’s involvement with a group associated with the 
Independent Order of Good Templars, a fraternal organization known for its promotion 
of temperance and prohibition.196  Through this association with the Good Templars, 
Browne became aware of the benefits, such as burial and life insurance, provided to the 
members of white fraternal organizations.  During the 1870s, there was a growing 
division within the Good Templars regarding racial integration of the organization.197  
                                                                                                                                                 
their insurance in force surpassed that of the regular life companies,” but their very nature prevented 
individual societies from attaining any considerable size because their “essence was exclusivity” or 
“protection from the surrounding milieu,” while regular life insurance companies provided “an adaptation 
to an urban, industrial society”).  
190 E.g., James D. Watkinson, William Washington Browne and the True Reformers of Richmond, Virginia, 
97 VA. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 375 (1989); C.G. Woodson, Insurance Business Among Negroes, 
14 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 202, 206 (1929). 
191 BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, THE NEGRO IN BUSINESS 162 (1907). 
192 ATLANTA UNIVERSITY, ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMOUNG NEGRO AMERICANS 101 (W.E.B. Du Bois 
ed., 1907). 
193 FRAZIER, supra note 96, at 397–98.  
194 Reid, supra note 83, at 40. 
195 Browne was born in 1849 and died in 1897.  The seventh son of field slaves who had been purchased in 
Virginia, Browne became a house servant in Georgia, a companion of his first owner’s son.  He later was 
hired out, first to a shopkeeper and then to an attorney.  Browne escaped while in his early teens, and made 
his way to Union troops in Memphis, where he became an officer’s servant.  When he discovered that 
Union forces surrendered escaped slaves at the request of slave owners, he left Memphis and worked at 
various jobs until he found farm work in Wisconsin, where he had learned that he could attend school.  In 
1864, he joined a Union infantry division as a paid substitute and served until 1866.  He returned to 
Wisconsin to continue his schooling and in September 1869, he traveled to Georgia to visit his mother.  He 
studied for the ministry in Atlanta, worked as a schoolteacher in Georgia and Alabama, spoke out against 
the Ku Klux Klan, and in 1876, was ordained a minister in the Colored (later Christian) Methodist Church.  
When the bishop of the Colored Methodist Church demanded that he give up his True Reformer work, 
Browne became a minister in the African Methodist Episcopal Church, but never held a pastorate.  FAHEY, 
supra note 98, at 14–15, 17. 
196 It was also known for its universalism.  The Independent Order of Good Templars accepted women as 
members with full rights to hold office, and also accepted an occasional black member in the North.  In 
addition, the Order avoided any mandatory insurance program that might prevent the membership of the 
poor, the old, or the sickly.  Id. at 13. 
197 Id. (explaining that the division came from differing racial views of members in the southern states and 
of those overseas, especially those in England and Scotland). 
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The American lodges resisted integration,198 and by 1876, Browne had organized an 
Alabama branch of the all-black True Reformers.199  After accepting an invitation in 1880 
to become leader of the True Reformers organization in Virginia, Browne settled in 
Richmond, Virginia.200   
¶60 Under Browne’s leadership, and that of his successor, W.L. Taylor, the True 
Reformers expanded greatly.  By 1903, according to contemporary reports, there were 
2097 Fountains across the country and 269 employees.201  Seven years later, the 
membership roll of the True Reformers had grown to over 50,000, and the organization 
could be found in over twenty states.202  The organization established its own bank, the 
True Reformers’ Savings Bank of Richmond, Virginia.203  It also operated its own 
newspaper,204 old-age home,205 retail stores,206 a 150 room hotel,207 and developed land 
for an all-black community in Richmond called Brownesville.208 
¶61 Recognizing the difficulties blacks encountered with white insurance companies, 
Browne sought to provide insurance coverage to members, including policies that would 
provide relief to beneficiaries and cover burial costs.209  Utilizing mainstream financial 
practices in insurance and other businesses, he initiated several important innovations.  
                                                 
198 Id. at 13–14.  Later, American fraternal orders and lodges also resisted imitation by black orders.  Some 
fraternal orders sued, with mixed success, their black counterparts seeking to enjoin the black orders from 
practicing such imitation.  See CHARLES S. MAGNUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 75–76 
(Johnson Reprint Corp 1940) (collecting cases).  In 1909, the governor of Georgia signed a bill that forbid 
the “use by Negro Secret Societies of the insignia, ritualistic work, grips, etc. of orders composed of 
whites.”  JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1900–1920, at 56 (1977). 
199 Watkinson, supra note 190, at 376 (the Grand Lodge of Good Templars offered Browne a charter and 
sponsorship under a separate name, the United Order of True Reformers).  
200 FAHEY, supra note 98, at 16. 
201 W.P. BURRELL & D.E. JOHNSON, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS HISTORY OF THE GRAND FOUNTAIN OF THE 
UNITED ORDER OF THE TRUE REFORMERS 315, 319 (1909).  
202 By 1909, the True Reformers had “60,000 men and women paying dues of from fifty-five to sixty cents 
per month; 15,000 men and women [in the Classes] paying from $1.20 to $2.85 cents each, every quarter, 
and 20,000 children paying sixteen cents per month, each.”  FAHEY, supra note 98, at 38.  
203 The Saving Bank of the Grand Fountain, United Order of True Reformers, which was established by an 
Act of Virginia’s General Assembly in 1888, was the first black-owned, black-operated bank to be 
chartered in the United States.  Watkinson, supra note 190, at 386 (noting, however, that a bank in the 
District of Columbia was the first such bank to begin operations).   
204 FRAZIER, supra note 96, at 373 (stating that The Reformer had a weekly circulation of approximately 
8000 subscribers by 1900). 
205 The Old Folks Home, built on 634 acres purchased in Westham in the west end of Richmond, was 
incorporated in 1898.  Watkinson, supra note 190, at 392. 
206 In 1899, the Reformers obtained a charter for the Reformers’ Mercantile and Industrial Association, 
which permitted it to establish stores, build and operate a hotel, carry on a printing and newspaper business, 
and deal in real estate as a former companying, bringing “under one roof the workings of the real estate 
department, the The Reformer offices and printing department, and the regalia department.”  Watkinson, 
supra note 190, at 394.  The Association opened its first store in Richmond in 1900, with others added later 
in Virginia and in Washington.  FAHEY, supra note 98, at 30. 
207 FAHEY, supra note 98, at 21 (located in Richmond, the hotel also served in part as a boarding house for 
True Reformer employees). 
208 David T. Beito, To Advance the “Practice of Thrift and Economy”: Fraternal Societies and Social 
Capital, 1890–1920, 29 J. OF INTERDISC. HIST. 585, 603 (1999).  Between 1899 and 1902, about 200 acres 
of the Westham property was divided into 130 small lots to support the home and create a black settlement 
that was connected by an electric streetcar with Richmond.  FAHEY, supra note 98, at 30.  When segregated 
streetcars were introduced in 1904, True Reformers helped lead protests in the black community and 
several protest meetings took place in True Reformers’ Hall.  Id.  
209 FAHEY, supra note 98, at 17. 
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Soon after its formation, the True Reformers became the first black benevolent society to 
disburse insurance benefits through a national office.210  He also instituted a sliding scale 
for insurance policies dependent upon the age and premium paid by the policyholder.211  
When the True Reformers began this practice in 1885, it was customary for such 
organizations to charge everyone below the maximum age for membership the same 
premium or assessment regardless of age or risk.212  The True Reformers would later 
require applicants to take a medical questionnaire and, in some cases, undergo a medical 
examination.213   
¶62 Although the True Reformers developed their insurance program into one of the 
most advanced enterprises of its kind undertaken by a black benevolent society, the 
revenues earned by the organization from its insurance policies also played a role in the 
financial collapse of the organization.  The money collected for insurance was used, 
through the bank, to finance other business enterprises that the Order managed.214  
Through a combination of unprofitable investments, poor recordkeeping, and poor 
management by officials of the bank, the True Reformers Savings Bank became bankrupt 
in 1910, and a court ordered the directors of the bank to close in late October of that 
year.215  
¶63 After the savings bank was ordered to close, the insurance commissioner barred 
the organization from accepting any new members in the state.216  Although the insurance 
commissioner reissued the True Reformers an insurance license in April of 1911, the 
organization could not overcome the problems it faced following the bank’s 
bankruptcy.217  The True Reformers never regained its earlier prominence.  Membership 
declined dramatically in 1911; by 1912, there were only five thousand members, and 
after the Great Depression, it became virtually nonexistent.218  Its legacy survived, 
however, through the influence of many of its former employees, including Richmond’s 
Maggie L. Walker,219 who used the skills and vision she developed with the True 
                                                 
210 Beito, supra note 208, at 602. 
211 Id.  See also BRYSON, supra note 134, at 8 (1948) (observing, however, that the True Reformers used a 
mortality table which was actuarially unsound).  The True Reformers also were one of the first benevolent 
organizations to have a children’s section within the organization.  By paying monthly dues for 
membership in the Rosebud Nursery, children could become eligible for sickness and burial insurance.  By 
1906, there were nearly 15,000 children on the Rosebud Nursery’s membership roster.  Beito, supra note 
208, at 603–04.   
212 FAHEY, supra note 98, at 16–17. 
213 Id. at 19. 
214 Id. at 32. 
215 Id. at 33.  The organization made unsecured loans to many True Reformer business projects.  When the 
businesses defaulted on loan payments, the bank could not pay claims brought against insurance policies 
issued by the order.  Watkinson, supra note 190, at 396.  
216 FAHEY, supra note 98, at 34. 
217 The order issued insurance until 1934, when its name no longer appeared in state insurance records.  See 
Watkinson, supra note 190, at 396.  
218 FAHEY, supra note 98, at 37. 
219 Walker often referred to the True Reformers as the model for the Independent Order of Saint Luke, 
which she led from 1899, after leaving the employ of the True Reformers, until her death in 1934.  The 
Order established a children’s auxiliary, which grew to over 15,000 by the 1920s, to provide insurance for 
children.  In addition, under her leadership, the Order established a number of other businesses, including a 
newspaper, a department store, and in 1903, the Saint Luke Penny Savings Bank.  Although the Order 
severed ties to the bank in 1911 because of state laws, it continued as the renamed Consolidated Bank and 
Trust Company of Richmond, Virginia.  In 1998, it ranked as the thirteenth largest black-owned bank, with 
assets exceeding $100 million.  Beito, supra note 208, at 607, 612 (citing the Black Enterprise for 
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Reformers to create other black businesses and insurance enterprises during the Jim Crow 
era.220   
2. Black Life Insurance Companies 
¶64 In the section of An American Dilemma dealing with economics and finance, 
Myrdal observed that black businesses tended to operate in highly race-segregated 
markets, and that many insurance companies were founded by blacks in response to race 
discrimination by white insurance companies.221   
¶65 During the period between 1880 and 1910, many insurance companies founded by 
blacks began selling insurance in the South and in urban areas with large African-
American communities.222  At least initially, they operated under fraternal assessment 
and mutual benefit charters, which had smaller initial capital requirements than those of 
legal reserve companies.223   
¶66 Black-owned companies faced difficulty in attracting capital, in part due to the 
negative effect of Hoffman’s 1896 book, Race Traits and Tendencies of the American 
Negro.224   Later, some of these companies were converted to legal reserve companies.  In 
other cases, officers and employees of these early relatively unregulated and 
undercapitalized companies left them to found legal reserve companies.225  These early 
companies built on the earlier experiences and traditions of black fraternal and 
benevolent societies, especially those of the True Reformers.226   
¶67 Several former True Reformers founded and became presidents of some of the 
most successful black insurance companies that emerged in the first half of the twentieth 
century.227  For example, North Carolina Mutual, the nation’s oldest black insurance 
company, was founded in 1898 as an assessment association by former True Reformers 
John Merrick and A.M. Moore,228 and converted to a legal reserve life insurance 
                                                                                                                                                 
information on the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company). 
220 Id. 
221 MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 316.  
222 See id. 
223 BRYSON, supra note 134, at 7.  Legal reserve life insurance companies “agree to pay a stipulated benefit, 
collect prescribed rates therefore, and by law maintain a reserve for each policy.”  CLOUGH, supra note 51, 
at 3 n.1.  Level premiums “made necessary an invested reserve fund” to compensate for the decline in the 
insured’s life expectancy.  KELLER, supra note 47, at 60.  The main variables in calculating a reserve 
included the proportion of the premium to be charged against the reserve, the assumed mortality rate, and 
the interest that the reserve would be expected to earn.  Id. at 60–62 (describing the state regulatory 
requirements for life insurance reserves during 1858–1905). 
224 BRYSON, supra note 134, at 7; see also Joseph A. Pierce, The Evolution of Negro Business, in BLACK 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 25, 32 (Ronald W. Bailey ed., 
1971).  See also discussion supra at Part III.B.3. 
225 BRYSON, supra note 134, at 7. 
226 JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK AMERICANS: A 
RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 119 (rev. ed. 2005) (“[I]f one were to choose a secret society 
which had a direct impact on the establishment of Afro-American insurance, it would be the Grand United 
Order of the True Reformers . . . .”). 
227 For example, former True Reformers either founded or became leaders of the North Carolina Mutual 
Life Insurance Company, the National Benefit Life Insurance Company, the American Beneficial Insurance 
Company, the Southern Aid Society, the Richmond Beneficial and Insurance Company, and the American 
Beneficial Insurance Company.  FAHEY, supra note 98, at 22; see also Beito, supra note 208, at 606. 
228 WILLIAM JESSE KENNEDY, THE NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL STORY: A SYMBOL OF PROGRESS 1898–
1970, at 1–6 (1970). 
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company in 1913.229  North Carolina Mutual weathered the Great Depression, a time 
when many insurance companies failed, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
was licensed to do business in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia, with over 
$12 billion of insurance policies in force.230 
¶68 Myrdal reported that in 1939, there were sixty-seven black-founded insurance 
companies that had survived the Great Depression, giving employment to about eight 
thousand workers.231  However, he concluded that it was “difficult to see a real future for 
a segregated Negro financial system,” and that it was a “poor substitute” for what was 
really needed—employment in white-dominated financial institutions and “more 
consideration for them as insurance or credit seekers.”232   
¶69 By the late 1960s, the forty-six company members of the National Insurance 
Association (formerly the National Negro Insurance Association)233 employed twelve 
thousand workers, including eight thousand agents.234  They “had assets of $418 million, 
insurance in force of $2,330 billion, and a premium income in excess of $115 million.”235  
As insurance markets became more integrated following the Civil Rights Movement, 
however, black companies encountered increasing competitive pressures from white 
companies in the products offered to their traditional customer base, as well as work 
                                                 
229 BRYSON, supra note 134, at 13 tbl.3.  
230 North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company, 
http://www.ncmutuallife.com/newsite/pages/about.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).  For discussion of the 
role played by sales agents and headquarters staff in the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company 
and other black financial businesses after 1880, see, for example, Angel Kwolek-Folland, The African 
American Financial Industries: Issues of Class, Race and Gender in the early 20th Century, 23 BUS. & 
ECON. HIST. 85, 85–107 (1994). 
231 MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 317, 1263 (stating that the modern history of that business centered around 
four institutions, the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company of Durham founded in 1898, the 
Standard Life Insurance Company of Atlanta organized in 1913 and dissolved in the 1920s, the National 
Benefit Life Insurance Company of Washington, D.C., which failed in 1931, and the Supreme Liberty Life 
Insurance Company of Chicago); see also, e.g., ALEXA BENSON HENDERSON, ATLANTA LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY: GUARDIAN OF BLACK ECONOMIC DIGNITY (1990); Robert Christian Puth, Supreme Life: The 
History of a Negro Life Insurance Company (Aug. 1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern 
University) (on file with the Northwestern University Library). 
232 MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 318. 
233 The National Negro Insurance Association was founded in 1921 in Durham, North Carolina, by leaders 
of black-owned insurance companies to encourage, foster, and stimulate the business of insurance.  In 
addition to the member companies, the Association reported in the late 1960s that there were at least seven 
other Negro life companies and a number of fraternal benefit associations that provide life insurance for 
their members.  The major life insurance company members in the late sixties included North Carolina 
Mutual Life Insurance Company, the largest member of the Association, as well as Golden State Mutual 
Life Insurance Company, Los Angeles; Supreme Life Insurance Company of America, Chicago; Atlanta 
Life Insurance Company, Atlanta; and Universal Life Insurance Company, Memphis, Tennessee.  
FLETCHER, supra note 96, at 128–29, 128 n.15.  In 1978, the Association’s roster reported only thirty-six 
member companies and four other non-member minority insurance companies.  U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PENSIONS AND HEALTH, LIFE, AND 
DISABILITY INSURANCE, VOL. II: EXHIBITS, Exhibit No. 12, at 1145–73 (1978) (letter of May 5, 1978 from 
Chris H. Howard, Associate Director, National Insurance Association, National Insurance Association 1978 
Member Roster).   
234 FLETCHER, supra note 96, at 128. 
235 Id.  By comparison, in 1945, the 44 member companies of the National Negro Insurance Association 
had an aggregate of over 3.9 million policies in force, “of which 232,441 were ordinary policies, and [3.8 
million] were industrial or health and accident policies.  The average size of ordinary policies was $690 and 
the median size of all industrial contracts was $140.28.”  Id. at 126–27.   
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opportunities available to their workforce.  Black companies thus sought new customers 
and business, including group life coverage sold to employers.   
¶70 A study of black insurance companies, published in 1970, noted that black firms 
were major targets for white insurers; white firms were “anxious to increase their ratio of 
Negro employees”236 and “capture the Negro market.”237  The study concluded that “the 
combined effect of these two events will ultimately have an impact—and probably 
detrimental—on those Negro firms that have pioneered in developing both the Negro life 
insurance market and employment skills and opportunities among black employees.”238 
¶71 By 1979, black insurance companies had responded to changes in the marketplace 
by yielding the relatively small market for black ordinary insurance to big companies 
with superior marketing capabilities and by concentrating their activities on the larger 
market segment of home service and industrial insurance business that the big companies 
had abandoned.239  At that time, only three out of the forty or so remaining minority life 
insurance companies sold ordinary insurance exclusively; they were small companies or 
confined primarily to a single state market.240 
¶72 At the end of the twentieth century, when an executive of a black insurance 
company predicted that in ten years, “only five African American-owned insurance firms 
will remain” and the rest will die or merge with other National Insurance Association 
members,241 Myrdal’s prediction of a limited future for a segregated financial system had 
largely come to pass.   
D. Ordinary and Intermediate Life Insurance: Race-Based Rates, Restrictions 
¶73 Race-based rates did not generally arise in the intermediate242 or ordinary life 
insurance market243 until the twentieth century, when companies like Metropolitan 
                                                 
236 Id. at 129.  In 1969, one white-owned insurance company hired nearly five hundred black sales 
representatives, a number twice as great as the number of employees hired that year by all black-owned 
insurance companies combined.  Jacob M. Duker & Charles E. Hughes, The Black-Owned Life Insurance 
Company: Issues and Recommendations, 40 J. RISK & INS. 221, 228 (1973). 
237 FLETCHER, supra note 96, at 129. 
238 Id.  
239 Debit Life Insurance Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business 
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. app. at 233, 237 (Mar. 12 and 16, 1979) (statement of the 
National Insurance Association).   
240 Id. at 238. 
241 Frank McCoy, Life Sustaining Measures, BLACK ENTERPRISE, June 1998, at X, 182 (quoting Larkin 
Teasley, the CEO of Golden State Mutual, and noting that in the late 1990s, Gold State Mutual started 
pursuing the Latino market); see also Jeffrey McKinney, Bold Players New Strategies 33rd Annual Report 
on Black Business: Holding Their Ground, BLACK ENTERPRISE, June 2005, at x (noting that companies like 
North Carolina Mutual are “adopting plans to buy other companies, sell products more aggressively to win 
affluent customers, and exit money-losing businesses”).   
 In addition, some minority insurance companies merged with major white insurance companies.  For 
example, United Mutual, which formed as a fraternal organization in 1933 and converted to a mutual life 
insurance company in 1945, merged with Metlife in 1992.  In 2002, the New York Insurance Department 
examined available surviving United Mutual records from 1937 to 1980, as well as several hundred 
application files from both their industrial and ordinary departments.  Among the 203 files from which the 
race of the policyholder could be determined, only eight were other than African-American and the 
“premiums each was charged was consistent with the premiums charged to similarly situated African-
Americans.”  See NY INS. DEPT., REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE, supra note 160, at 12, 26 (finding no 
race distinct underwriting practices). 
242 Intermediate policies are a cross between industrial and ordinary insurance.  S.S. HUEBNER, LIFE 
INSURANCE 322–23 (4th ed. 1950) (For example, “[i]n 1927 one large company introduced industrial 
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noticed that the proportion of black lives in the intermediate branch “had grown to a point 
where the over-all mortality of the group was being raised significantly.”244  The same 
general approach as in the industrial branch was applied in 1930, but discontinued at the 
beginning of 1935.245  At that time, a simpler rule was adopted under which the excess 
mortality was offset by paying only partial commissions on policies issued to blacks.246 
¶74 In 1935, the New York anti-discrimination law was amended to disallow any 
distinction due to race in the amount of commissions paid for writing the policy.247  In 
response, Metropolitan reacted the same way it did in its industrial business when 
Massachusetts passed a law prohibiting race-based premiums in 1884:248 It discontinued 
soliciting black customers for any kind of life insurance in New York.249  The black press 
in New York ran a series of articles complaining about Metropolitan’s refusal to sell 
blacks its full range of products,250 and the New York Temporary Commission on the 
Condition of the Urban Colored Population announced that it planned to investigate 
Metropolitan and other companies for alleged “discriminatory practices against 
Negroes.”251  Outside of New York, the company continued to maintain its dual race-
based commission structure,252 explaining that “where possible” the company had tried to 
insure black lives but “at rates commensurate with mortality experience.”253   
                                                                                                                                                 
insurance on a monthly plan, the size of policies ranging from $500 to $800.”).  
243 Prudential established its ordinary insurance branch in 1886, and by the end of 1890, was selling more 
than two thousand ordinary policies a year.  WILLIAM H. A. CARR, FROM THREE CENTS A WEEK. . . : THE 
STORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 40 (1975).  In the late nineteenth century, 
the “Big Three” companies selling ordinary life insurance were the Mutual Life Insurance Company, the 
Equitable Life Assurance Society, and the New York Life Insurance Company.  KELLER, supra note 47, at 
12–13.  By the turn of the century, Prudential and Metropolitan had rapidly growing ordinary and 
intermediate life insurance departments “which appealed with great success to a lower middle class market 
untouched by the Big Three.”  Id. at 14. 
244 JAMES, supra note 112, at 339 (beginning in the 1920s).  In its examination of Metropolitan’s race-based 
underwriting practices, the New York Insurance Department found that among the policyholders in the 
1920s whose race could be determined, about eighty-two percent of whites received ordinary policies and 
seventeen percent received intermediate policies.  In contrast, twelve percent of blacks received ordinary 
policies and eighty-eight percent received intermediate policies.  After analyzing a sample of application 
files, the examiner concluded that the company classified black applicants seeking policies by the ordinary 
department as “intermediate” based on race.  See NYS INS. DEPT., REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE, supra 
note 160, at 15.  
245 JAMES, supra note 112, at 339. 
246 Id. 
247 N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ch. 30, §90 (Cahill 1930), amended by N.Y. Laws of 1935, ch. 736 (1931–35 
cumulative supplement) (providing that “[n]o life insurance corporation doing business in this state shall 
reject any application for a policy of life insurance issued and sold by it, or refuse to issue such policy after 
proper application therefore, nor shall any lower rate be fixed or discrimination made by it in the fees or 
commissions of its agents for writing such policy, solely by reason of the applicant being wholly or 
partially of African descent,” and providing for a fine of one thousand dollars for violation of the 
provision).    
248 See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
249 JAMES, supra note 112, at 339. 
250 Report of Henry M. McKiven, Ph.D., Norflet v. John Hancock Financial Services Inc. and John 
Hancock Life Insurance Co., No. 04-1099 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2007) (rulings on motion to compel 
discovery, citing articles from the Amsterdam News on September 24 and July 23, 1938, and on January 28 
and November 11, 1939, and from the New York Age on September 24 and October 15, 1938, and February 
28, 1939). 
251 Id. 
252 See NYS INS. DEPT., REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE, supra note 160, at 22 (finding that from 1935 
through at least 1949, agents outside New York received twenty percent of full scale commissions on 
ordinary policies issued to African-Americans, and agents received no issue credit and no first-year 
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¶75 In 1938, when a black policyholder in Brooklyn complained to Metropolitan and 
the NAACP that he was unable to buy additional insurance from his neighborhood 
insurance representative, the company explained by letter to the policyholder that “in 
New York we have found it necessary to assign the collection of colored debits to 
collectors who are not authorized to sell life insurance to any one, regardless of color” 
and that “the only change in our practice in New York is that we do not actively solicit 
applications for insurance from colored persons.”254  However, the letter continued, 
“[s]uch persons may apply at one of our district offices, of which there are a large 
number conveniently located, and they will receive fair and courteous treatment when 
they so apply.”255   
¶76 Shortly thereafter, the NAACP issued a press release reporting that Metropolitan, 
which had “written millions upon millions of dollars of insurance upon Negroes in this 
country,” had ceased to solicit business from blacks in New York,256 and publicized the 
company’s statement that applications for such business would be accepted at the 
company’s district offices.257   
¶77 The NAACP was also receiving complaints about discrimination against blacks 
with regard to other types of insurance coverage, including automobile insurance.258  
Although the NAACP compiled information and urged investigation of such practices by 
state agencies, it did not challenge them through litigation.  As Thurgood Marshall 
explained in a letter to Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union259 when 
Travelers insurance company had denied Marshall auto insurance coverage, the company 
stated that this was because he lived “in a ‘congested area,’ meaning Harlem, and ‘not’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
commissions for intermediate policies issued to African-Americans). 
253 JAMES, supra note 112, at 339. 
254 Letter from Charles J. Taylor, Jr., Second Vice President, The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 
New York City, to Z. Marshall Cochrane of Brooklyn, New York, July 27, 1938 (from NAACP files, 
reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (explaining that the 
change in the company's practice was due to legislation enacted in 1935, which was "introduced and 
sponsored by Assemblyman Stephens of New York City, a colored man"). 
255 Id. 
256 Press Release, NAACP, Metropolitan Life Not Seeking Negro Business in New York State, Anti-Jim 
Crow Law Cited by Company as Reason for Its Failure to Permit Agents to Solicit New Policies; Prospects 
Must Apply at Company Offices (Sept. 16, 1938) [hereinafter NAACP Press Release] (from NAACP files, 
reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).  The NAACP's press 
release explained the 1935 legislation as follows: “It has been known for years that some insurance 
companies have refused to sell certain types of policies to Negroes, no matter how qualified Negroes might 
be to purchase the same.  It was this policy which prompted Assemblyman Stephens to sponsor his law in 
the 1935 legislature outlawing jim crow treatment.”  Id.  See also supra note 254. 
257 The press release also observed as follows: “The N.A.A.C.P. so far has had no complaints about 
treatment of colored people who apply to district offices.  It is not known whether they are having any extra 
difficulty securing the same types of policies as are issued to whites.”  NAACP Press Release, supra note 
256. 
258 See Confidential Memorandum for the NAACP Re: Refusal of Insurance Companies to Accept 
Applications for Automobile Risks When Cars are Owned by Negroes (May 27, 1941) (reproduced from 
the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
259 Letter from Roger Baldwin, American Civil Liberties Union, to Thurgood Marshall (Apr. 18, 1940) 
(from NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) 
(enclosing a clipping entitled “Why the Color Line in Automobile Insurance?” (quoting the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch as reporting that “the attitude of insurance companies generally is that Negroes are not good risks 
for public liability and property damage insurance”) and containing a hand-written note at the bottom of the 
clipping stating, “[h]ere’s a topic you folks might look into”). 
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because I am a Negro.”260  In many cases, the insurance companies relied on facially 
neutral underwriting factors to explain the denial of coverage, rather than explicit race-
based classifications.261  Although in Marshall’s view, the problem was growing rather 
than diminishing, it was “practically impossible to work out a court case because the 
insurance is usually refused on some technical ground.”262   
¶78 About a decade later, however, a case involving an explicit race-based denial of 
life insurance coverage came to the NAACP’s attention.263  In the late 1940s, a 
Wisconsin resident named James Rancher, a student who worked at a shoe repair shop, 
applied for $1,000 of ordinary life insurance264 under the State of Wisconsin’s life 
insurance fund.265  The state’s life insurance fund had been established in 1911 in 
response to certain problems identified with industrial insurance.266   
¶79 The state’s application form asked for Rancher’s nationality and race, which he 
completed as “American Negro.”267  Although legislation forbidding life insurance 
companies to engage in rate or other discrimination between blacks and whites had been 
                                                 
260 Letter from Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, to Roger Baldwin, American Civil Liberties Union 
(Apr. 19, 1940) (from NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress) (thanking Baldwin for a clipping from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of April 15, 1940, and 
explaining that it “is a difficult problem to handle,” and that “we expect a conference for some time in the 
near future with State officials and the leading Insurance companies on the question”); Letter from Louis 
Pink, Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York, to Walter White of the NAACP (Oct. 8, 1941) (from 
NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (inviting 
White to a conference to discuss the problem that “colored people often find it difficult to procure life and 
health and accident insurance and that there is discrimination against them”).  See also Memorandum from 
Herbert Hill to Robert Carter (Aug. 2, 1954) (from NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (requesting advice for the Jewish Labor Committee from the 
NAACP Legal Department as to the “possibilities of some action regarding this matter,” and referring to an 
attached “application form distributed by The Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association which 
contains a box requesting a ‘color’ designation”). 
261 Sometimes the policies were more explicit.  Historian John Hope Franklin, in his recently published 
autobiography, recounts a conversation he had in 1957 with his life insurance agent about the company’s 
loan program to help policyholders who sought assistance in purchasing a home.  The agent explained that 
the company could not lend him the money because the loan would mean that “he would have helped 
Negroes ‘jump’ over the line into a ‘white’ neighborhood.  His company’s standing rule was never to 
directly facilitate such a jump.  I promptly informed him that I was canceling my insurance with him, and if 
I needed any in the future I would seek it with a company that had the courage to loan me the money to 
purchase a home where my family wished to live and not where the insurance company wished us to live.”  
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, MIRROR TO AMERICA: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN 177–79 
(2005).  I am grateful to Professor Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham for bringing Franklin’s home loan 
experience to my attention.  
262 Letter from Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, to Roger Baldwin, American Civil Liberties Union 
(Apr. 19, 1940) (from NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress). 
263 See NAACP, Discrimination Insurance Companies 1940–1954 (reproduced from the Collections of the 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
264 Trial Record at Exhibit 14, Jimmie Rancher’s Application for Insurance, Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 
542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2).  
265 See Appellant’s Brief at Statement of Facts 3, Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2).  
The state life fund had been established “to be administered by the state without liability on the part of the 
state, beyond the amount of the fund, for the purpose of granting life insurance . . . and annuities” to 
residents and others within the state.   Id. at 7 (quoting from WIS. STAT. § 210.05). 
266 The fund was established by the state legislature in 1911, as part of a reform movement to protect poorer 
policyholders from exorbitant insurance premiums and other abusive practices of the insurance industry.  
See MCGILL, supra note 153, at 811. 
267 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, at 7. 
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introduced in Wisconsin several times during the 1930s, those bills were not enacted into 
law.268  
¶80 Rancher’s application was rejected by the state insurance commissioner in 1949, 
on the ground that all Negroes and other non-Caucasian races were “substandard” 
insurance risks, and thus ineligible for coverage.269  In making that determination, the 
commissioner relied on the greater mortality experience of insured blacks, which in 1940, 
was approximately 150% of the mortality among insured whites.270  In addition, the 
commissioner maintained that under the governing statute, he was not authorized to issue 
policies at rates other than those based on the American Experience Table of Mortality,271 
except for those in hazardous occupations.272  The commissioner therefore rejected all 
non-white applications.273   
¶81 Rancher challenged the denial of coverage in federal court, and when the state 
insurance commissioner sought a declaratory judgment in state court regarding his 
interpretation of the governing statute, Rancher filed a counterclaim.274  The state trial 
court held that the rejection of his application on the basis of race constituted a proper 
interpretation of the statute, and that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause under either the state or federal constitution.275   
¶82 The trial court found as a factual matter that the commissioner’s classification of 
blacks as substandard risks was based on the substantially higher mortality rate among 
blacks than among whites.276  Although extensive testimony was received at trial tending 
to show that higher mortality rate of blacks as a group was due to environmental rather 
than physical differences,277 the trial court found that evidence to be inconclusive.278  
                                                 
268 See SPENCER L. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A STUDY IN THE LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION 
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY, BASED ON WISCONSIN RECORDS 1835–1959, at 126 (1960).  
Similarly, according to Kimball, bills were introduced in 1951 and 1953 to forbid the state life fund to 
discriminate on the basis of race, but were not enacted.  Id.  Discrimination on the basis of race in auto 
insurance, however, had been banned by the state legislature since the early 1930s.  Act of Mar. 26, 1931, 
ch. 21, 1931 Wis. Sess. Laws 20 (providing that “any person who . . . shall refuse to sell or furnish any type 
of automobile insurance or charge a higher rate for such insurance because of race or color, shall be liable 
to the person aggrieved thereby in damages”). 
269 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, Statement of Facts at 3.  See also Trial Record at Exhibit 11, Letter 
from John Lange, Commissioner of Insurance, to Jimmie Rancher, plaintiff, dated April 21, 1949, Lange v. 
Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2) (informing Rancher that he was a substandard risk because he 
was not Caucasian).   
270 Respondent’s Brief at 8–9, Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2) (summarizing the 
trial court’s findings). 
271 According to the briefs filed before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the statutory provisions establishing 
the state life fund and specifying premiums based on the American Experience Table of Mortality were 
enacted by the state legislature in 1911 as part of a reform movement to protect poorer policyholders from 
exorbitant insurance premiums and other abusive practices of the insurance industry.  Respondent’s Brief, 
supra note 270, Argument at 25; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, at Argument at 26–28.  As described 
by the appellant’s brief, the American Experience Table of Mortality was authorized, and sometimes 
required, by a number of states to set premiums for life insurance sold between approximately 1902 and 
1948, when it was replaced in many states by the Commissioners Standard Ordinary Mortality Table.  
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, Argument at 24–25.   
272 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 270, Argument at 13–14. 
273 Id. 
274 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, Statement of Facts at 3–4. 
275 Id. at 4. 
276 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 270, Questions Presented at 3.  
277 The trial record in Rancher contains testimony that the variations in group mortality rates between 
whites and blacks are related to environmental factors, not biology.  This testimony includes statements 
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Although the evidence also showed that a few insurance companies granted life insurance 
to blacks upon the same basis as whites,279 the trial court found that most large private 
companies had not accepted classifying risks without regard to race.  Life insurance 
companies would generally differentiate between blacks and whites by charging a higher 
premium for insuring blacks, or allowing a lesser commission to agents for selling 
insurance to blacks, or limiting the solicitation of blacks.280  The trial court viewed the 
classification as reasonable and germane to state statutory requirements, which did not 
permit the commissioner to insure blacks at premiums in excess of the standard premium 
rates.281 
¶83 On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Lange v. Rancher,282 reversed the 
trial court ruling and held that that the insurance commissioner had “failed to show that 
the racial classification [was] the only one which will achieve the purposes for which the 
State Life Fund was created.”283  The court required the commissioner to use a race-
neutral classification, unless he could show that race itself was a decisive factor in the 
unfavorable mortality experience.   
¶84 Unlike the trial court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not view the practices of 
private insurance companies to be controlling and emphasized that the case involved an 
individual applicant, not a group.284  There was evidence in the record that some blacks 
“whose applications [were] properly screened and evaluated would have a mortality 
equal to that of white persons.”285  The court concluded that the summary rejection of 
Rancher’s application without investigation or evaluation, under standards applied to 
white applicants, did not comply with the provisions of the statute.286   
¶85 Because the statute itself, properly construed, required equal treatment of black 
and white insurance applicants, the court did not base its conclusion on equal protection 
grounds under the federal or state constitutions.287  In addition, because the case dealt 
only with the state-sponsored insurance fund, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 1953 
                                                                                                                                                 
from professors of Anthropology, Zoology, and Genetics at the University of Wisconsin, a Professor of 
Anthropology at the University of Chicago, and the Assistant Director of the Chicago Community 
Inventory, who had researched mortality rates in Chicago.  
278 Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W. 2d 542, 547 (Wis. 1953) (dissenting opinion); see also Respondent’s Brief, 
supra note 270, Statement of Facts at 5.  
279 Rancher, 56 N.W. 2d at 544.  Examples of private companies with race-neutral policies included the 
Mutual Life Insurance of New York, TIAA-CREF, which sold insurance policies to professors, and the 
CUNA Mutual Insurance Company, which sold insurance to members of credit unions.  In addition, the 
record includes other insurance organizations that did not differentiate in rates or benefits on the basis of 
race, including policies sold by the government to members of the armed forces in World Wars I and II.  
Respondent's Brief, supra note 270, Argument at 24; see also Trial Record at Exhibit 23, Letter from R.D. 
Peck, Director, Veterans Administration, to William Gold, attorney, dated March 3, 1950, Lange v. 
Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2) (explaining that none of the data used in obtaining mortality 
rates under either the United States Government Life Insurance or National Service Life Insurance are 
subdivided by race or color of the insured).  
280 Rancher, 56 N.W. 2d at 543-44 (majority opinion), 547 (dissenting opinion); Respondent’s Brief, supra 
note 270, Statement of Facts at 6–7.  
281 Rancher, 56 N.W. 2d at 545-47 (dissenting opinion); Respondent’s Brief, supra note 270, Questions 
Presented at 4.  
282 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953).  
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decision in Lange v. Rancher did not reach the race-based practices of private 
commercial insurance companies.   
¶86 However, by the early 1950s, private insurance companies began modifying their 
race-based ordinary insurance practices.  For example, in 1951, Metropolitan authorized 
its agents to solicit African-American business in New York, subject to the same rules on 
commissions that applied to white lives.288  By the end of 1954, it had eliminated most of 
its rules on race-based commissions,289 and by 1958, with the possible exception of 
agents operating under old renewal agreements, all race-based practices with regard to 
dual commissions had ceased.290  Nevertheless, at least through the mid-1960s, the 
company engaged in other race-based practices, including collecting information about 
the race of insurance applicants, imposing different policy limits and medical 
examination requirements on black applicants, and applying different financial reporting 
standards for non-white applicants or for white applicants in interracial marriages.291 
E.  The Discrediting of Scientific Racism after World War II  
¶87 When Myrdal conducted his influential survey of race relations in America,292 
prominent individual American scientists, including anthropologist Franz Boas and 
several of his former students, had for several decades been challenging the biological 
understanding of race in various scientific circles.293  In the 1930s and early 1940s, Boas 
and his associates began organizing and writing statements aimed at the general public 
against the “scientific” racism of the Nazi regime.294   
¶88 The broader scientific community also began to take a public position against the 
Nazi regime’s racial theories in anti-racist declarations.  In December 1938, an anti-racist 
Scientists’ Manifesto was released at a news conference with over twelve hundred 
signatures, including three Nobel laureates and sixty-four members of the National 
Academy of Scientists.295  In addition to statements signed by individual scientists, 
American academic organizations and scientific societies began issuing anti-racist 
statements in 1938.  These included the American Association of University Professors, 
which protested against totalitarian persecution of teachers “on account of their race, 
religion, or political ideas,”296 the American Anthropological Association, which 
                                                 
288 See NYS INS. DEPT., REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE, supra note 160, at 22–23.  
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 23. 
291 Id. at 18–20, 24.  In addition, see the description of Metropolitan’s policies, adopted in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, which discouraged the sale of standard ordinary policies to black customers, including 
“occupational” and “area” underwriting, mercantile reports, and controls on the volume and quality of 
policies held by African-American policyholders in Thompson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 
2d 38, 43–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
292 See discussion supra at the beginning of Part III. 
293 E.g., BARKAN, supra note 18, at 66–134 (discussing the work of Franz Boas and his associates).  
294 See, e.g., RUTH BENEDICT, RACE AND RACISM viii (1942) (describing racism as “a travesty” of scientific 
knowledge); RUTH BENEDICT, RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITICS 151–218 (1940). 
295 BARKAN, supra note 18, at 337. 
296 Id. at 338–39.  The texts of the resolutions are reproduced in BENEDICT, RACE AND RACISM, supra note 
294, at 166–71 (including resolutions by the American Association of University Professors from 
December 28, 1938, the American Anthropological Association from December 1938, the Executive 
Council of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Annual Meeting of the American 
Psychological Association, December 1938, and the Manifesto from the Seventh International Genetics 
Congress at Edinburgh, August 28–30, 1939).  
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approved a resolution against Nazi classification of race, and the Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues.297  The repudiation of scientific racism continued 
into 1939 when a group of leading geneticists at the International Congress of Genetics 
issued an anti-racist Geneticists’ Manifesto,298 and culminated in the 1950 U.N. 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declaration on “The Race 
Question.”299  Representing the “most modern views of biologists, geneticists, 
psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists,”300 the UNESCO statement declared: (1) 
that the mental capacities of all races are similar; (2) that no evidence for biological 
deterioration as a result of racial mixing or hybridization existed; (3) that “genetic 
differences are not of importance in determining the social and cultural differences” 
between groups of people; and (4) that for all practical social purposes, “race is not so 
much a biological phenomenon as a social myth.”301   
¶89 Fifteen years earlier, as explained in the introduction to UNESCO’s statement on 
race, the European scientific community had failed to issue a definitive statement on the 
race question at a conference organized by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-
operation, a project that it “had to abandon in deference to the appeasement policy of the 
pre-War period.”302  As noted by Elazar Barkan in his study of the refutation of scientific 
foundations for racism, the UNESCO statement illustrates the major shift that occurred 
between the two world wars, when biological explanations of race were largely replaced 
by cultural or environmental analysis.303   
¶90 When scientists rejected the notion of innate or “natural” racial traits, the original 
rationale for race-distinct pricing in insurance was undermined.  If race-classified 
mortality differentials were largely related to the social, economic, and environmental 
conditions experienced by black Americans—conditions that were then under attack by 
the Civil Rights Movement as closely tied to the Jim Crow system of legalized racial 
separation and subordination—then pricing differentials based on the race of individual 
policyholders could no longer be justified or sustained by the industry.   
¶91 As discussed above,304 in the early 1960s, race-merged industrial mortality tables 
were developed with the assistance of private industry actuaries305 and approved by 
                                                 
297 BARKAN, supra note 18, at 338–39; see also BENEDICT, SCIENCE AND POLITICS, supra note 294, at 166 
(reproducing the resolution, which decried distortion of anthropological data “to serve the cause of an 
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industry regulators to replace the racially identified “standard” and “substandard” 
mortality tables first adopted in 1907, and later revised in 1941.  The influence of 
professional societies of actuaries in this process under the supervision of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners permitted change on an industry-wide basis.  
These changes brought the industry more in line with prevailing scientific views.  In 
addition, the industry’s rejection of race-based practices and the adoption of race-merged 
tables showed growing responsiveness to civil rights concerns.   
¶92 In sum, the development of a standard race-integrated or race-merged table 
followed in the decade after a consensus developed within the politically involved 
scientific community that racial difference reflected cultural rather than biological 
difference.  The consensus of important figures in the scientific community, which could 
not be achieved in the mid-1930s given the political context in pre-war Europe, was 
finally reached following World War II.  Because of the role of industry groups within 
the profession of actuarial science, prospective change could be made on a broad 
industry-wide basis.  Although insurance companies would continue to factor mortality 
experience of their policyholders into their overall cost analysis, the biggest 
“mainstream” companies no longer used race-distinct mortality tables to maintain dual-
rate pricing structures. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶93 As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed in The Path of the Law, published shortly 
after the United States Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson, “[w]e do not realize 
how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of 
the public mind.”306  A similar dynamic applies to reconsideration of private commercial 
practice.   
¶94 Race-based insurance practices both mirrored and reinforced the racial 
assumptions and hierarchies of the surrounding political, scientific, economic, and social 
culture of the times.307  Reflecting “the habit of the public mind,” they proved highly 
resistant to change until the underlying racial assumptions were challenged by the 
transformative event of World War II and by the post-war Civil Rights Movement.308   
¶95 Like Jim Crow state-sanctioned race segregation, which prevented “an enforced 
co-mingling of the two races,”309 the insurance industry justified and enforced Jim Crow 
race-based practices by reference to inherent or natural racial differences.310  After 
Reconstruction, life insurance companies began insuring emancipated slaves at two-thirds 
the benefits provided to white policyholders.311  Although the values echoed slavery era 
racial hierarchies, the companies explained the change by reference to the “excessive 
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mortality” and “innate” racial traits of former slaves.  Race-categorized mortality 
differentials quantified those differences and classified policyholders as “standard” and 
“substandard” risks.  Race-based pricing structures thus underscored the dominant 
ideological assumptions about racial superiority and inferiority.312   
¶96 By contrast, where observable mortality differentials did not reinforce background 
status hierarchies, they tended to be disregarded for pricing purposes.  For example, the 
industry’s mortality experience in the late nineteenth century and beginning of the 
twentieth century showed mortality differentials among industrial policyholder groups 
classified by gender that approached, and at certain ages exceeded, the differentials 
observed in groups categorized by race.  Although males on average experienced greater 
mortality than females, the industry maintained sex-merged mortality tables and gender-
neutral pricing in those markets.313  Thus, the industrial companies generally did not 
charge males, other than black males, higher rates as “substandard” risks.   
¶97 When Jim Crow segregation came under attack in the second Reconstruction 
following World War II, the underlying justifications for race-based pricing were finally 
discredited.  The repudiation of scientific racism after the defeat of the Nazi regime led to 
a fundamental rethinking of race.  Cultural and environmental understandings replaced 
“natural” and “biological” explanations of race.  When the Civil Rights Movement 
successfully attacked Jim Crow for its role in creating and maintaining unequal social and 
environmental conditions, the insurance industry could no longer sustain higher rates or 
coverage restrictions for black Americans based on “substandard” mortality categorized 
by race.   
¶98 Beginning in the late 1940s, a leading industrial life insurance company, under 
increasing pressure from the Civil Rights Movement, began equalizing rates despite 
continuing race-correlated mortality differentials.  Later, the industry achieved a form of 
collective action in the early 1960s, with the development of race-integrated tables by 
industry professional groups, approved for state regulatory purposes by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners.  Thus, by the time the Civil Rights Movement 
achieved landmark legal and legislative reforms in the mid-1960s, the life insurance 
industry had adopted a race-integrated mortality table and the leading companies had 
voluntarily discontinued explicit race-based pricing practices for newly issued policies.   
¶99 Shortly thereafter, the former “Big Three” industrial companies (Prudential, 
Metropolitan, and John Hancock) withdrew from the industrial insurance market by 
discontinuing the sale of new industrial policies.  They left that business to smaller or 
historically black companies operating primarily in southern markets.  The bigger 
companies aimed their future marketing efforts at the more prosperous middle class, 
including black policyholders who could afford ordinary life insurance.   
¶100 Earlier state legislative efforts to eliminate explicit race-based pricing had been 
largely ineffective in accomplishing lasting reform.  Beginning in the late nineteenth 
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century, several Northern states passed laws prohibiting differentials in life insurance 
premiums or benefits solely on the basis of race.  These state laws rejected race as a 
classification category.  Although individuals could be classified on some other basis 
such as health or habits, they could not be placed in a lesser rating category solely on the 
basis of race.314   
¶101 Some companies responded by adopting other types of less visible practices to 
limit their risk, such as more stringent medical examinations or credit checks for all black 
applicants.  Others pulled their business from those states or thereafter declined to solicit 
black business anywhere.315  The resulting market segmentation led to racial segregation 
of insurance markets and the development of black-owned insurance companies, 
mirroring patterns of race separation, subordination, and segregation found more 
generally in America during the Jim Crow era.316  Not until the end of the twentieth 
century did many of the smaller companies change their dual rate practices; some did not 
eliminate them until faced with state insurance department investigations or lawsuits by 
black policyholders.317   
¶102 In conclusion, as history shows, given the structure and regulation of life 
insurance markets, lasting reform could not be accomplished state-by-state or market-by-
market.  Change came from a form of collective action by life insurance industry 
professional groups, which was achieved only after a fundamental rethinking of race, a 
“change in the habit of the public mind” that led to reconsideration of long-established 
commercial practice. 
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